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A WINNING APPROACH TO LOSS CAUSATION UNDER
RULE 10B-5 IN LIGHT OF THE PRIVATE SECURITIES
LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995 ("PSLRA")
DavidS. Escoffery"
INTRODUCTION

To recover damages in a private cause of action under Securities
and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-51 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 ("1934 Act"),2 a plaintiff must plead and prove "loss
causation. '3 While circuits agree that loss causation refers to the
causal nexus between a plaintiff's injury and a defendant's wrongful
conduct, 4 they disagree on how direct the connection must be. 5 How a
court specifically defines loss causation is critical because it directly
affects the extent of a plaintiff's burden of proof. Thus, a court's view
on loss causation can ultimately be the principal determinant in
assessing a defendant's liability.
The loss causation controversy can be traced back to loss
causation's unstable foundation.'
Loss causation developed
exclusively out of case law7 and was never expressly recognized by the
Supreme Court.' Consequently, courts formulated different
* I dedicate this Note to my wife, Stacey, my parents, Carol and Alan, and my
brother, Eric. I truly appreciate all of their encouragement, inspiration, love, and
support. I would also like to thank Professor Benjamin C. Zipursky for his insightful
comments and guidance in writing this Note.
1. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1998); infra note 33 and accompanying text. The
purpose of Rule 10b-5 is to combat securities fraud. See Thomas Lee Hazen, The Law
of Securities Regulation 669 (Hornbook Series, Student Edition 2d ed. 1990).
2. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1994).
3. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (Supp. 1997); infra notes 265, 315 and
accompanying text. For a brief description of the requisite elements in a Rule 10b-5
private cause of action, see infra Part I.B.
4. See Hazen, supra note 1, at 704.
5. See id.
6. See Michael J. Kaufman, Loss Causation:Exposing A Fraudon Securities Law
Jurisprudence,24 Ind. L. Rev. 357, 357-58 (1991) [hereinafter Kaufman, Exposing
Fraud].
7. See Julie A. Herzog, Fraud Created the Market: An Unwise and Unwarranted
Extension of Section 10(B) and Rule 10B-5, 63 Geo. Wash. L Rev. 359, 360 (1995);
Andrew L. Merritt, A Consistent Model of Loss Causation in Securities Fraud
Litigation:Suiting the Remedy to the Wrong, 66 Tex. L Rev 469,484-85 (1988).
8. See Michael J. Kaufman, Living in a Material World: Strict Liability Under
Rule 10B-5, 19 Cap. U. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1990) [hereinafter Kaufman, Material Worli;
Richard A. Millisor, Rebutting the Levinson Presumnption of Reliance: The
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approaches to loss causation without any source of uniform guidance.9
The majority of courts adopted a narrow view of loss causation.
Under the majority view, a plaintiff who uses post-transaction
investment value to measure recoverable loss must establish a
connection between the post-transaction investment value and the
defendant's fraud. For example, suppose investor A purchases stock
in XYZ Company on day 1 and on day 5 the price of XYZ Company
stock drops. Next, suppose that investor A sues XYZ Company
pursuant to Rule 10b-5 in an attempt to recover for the decline in the
value of the stock. A majority-view jurisdiction would require
investor A to establish a connection between XYZ Company's fraud
and the drop in the stock price on day 5.10 The direct causation
approach, the foreseeability approach, and the materialization-of-therisk approach all adhere to the majority view.
The some-causal-nexus approach, on the other hand, complies with
the minority view, which defines loss causation in broader terms.
Under the minority view, a plaintiff who uses post-transaction
investment value to measure recoverable loss does not necessarily
have to link the defendant's fraud to the post-transaction investment
value.
The plaintiff can establish loss causation by simply
demonstrating that the defendant's fraud was in some way responsible
for artificially altering the transaction price. For example, in the
above illustration, a minority-view jurisdiction would allow investor A
to establish loss causation by showing that on day 1 the price of XYZ
Company stock was artificially inflated because of XYZ Company's
fraud."
Thus, proving loss causation is easier for plaintiffs in
minority-view jurisdictions.
In December 1995, loss causation was finally considered by a
central authority when Congress enacted the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (the "PSLRA"). 1 Section 101(b) 3 of
the PSLRA codified loss causation by adding section 21D(b)(4) 4 to
the 1934 Act. Section 21D(b)(4) provides that the plaintiff has the
Consistency and Relevancy of Enquiring into a Plaintiffs Conduct in Certain Rule
JOB-5 Fraud on the Market Cases, 61 U. Colo. L. Rev. 625, 629 (1990); see also infra
Part II.B (discussing Supreme Court jurisprudence that touches on issues of
causation).
9. For a detailed description of each approach, see infra Part II.C.
10. This example is not meant to suggest that all Rule lob-5 cases involve a drop
in the price of publicly traded stock. It is merely one illustration of the majority view.
For a more comprehensive analysis of the majority approach, see infra Part II.C.l.
11. For a more comprehensive analysis of the minority view, see infra Part II.C.2.
12. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109
Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
13. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, tit. 1,
sec. 101(b), 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (Supp. 1997)).
14. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, tit. 1,
sec. 101(b), § 21D(b)(4), 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4)
(Supp. 1997)).

2000]

LOSS CAUSATION UNDER RULE JOB-5

1783

burden of proving loss causation for all private actions arising out of
section 10(b)' 5 of the 1934 Act.16 Although the PSLRA does not
clearly delineate the boundaries of loss causation or expressly provide
loss causation, it does subject courts
courts with a model approach 1to
7
to a central loss causation rule.
Part I of this Note traces the historical development of Rule lOb-5
and outlines the essential elements in a Rule 10b-5 cause of action.
Part II explores loss causation's origin, examines Supreme Court
jurisprudence that touches on issues of causation, and sets forth a
detailed description of the various loss causation approaches. Part III
delves into the legislative history of the PSLRA and discusses the
Congressional rationale for creating the Act. Part IV critiques the
various loss causation approaches and argues that courts should settle
their differences in favor of the materialization-of-the-risk approach,
which this Note considers the winning approach to loss causation."
I. BACKGROUND

Because courts are divided on how to approach loss causation in a
private cause of action brought pursuant to Rule lOb-5, it is beneficial
to begin loss causation analysis with a general overview of Rule 10b-5.
This part provides such an overview by examining the evolution of
Rule 10b-519 and describing the essential elements in a Rule 10b-5
private cause of action.'
A. HistoricalOverview of Rule lOb-5
2
Congress passed both the Securities Act of 1933 (the -1933 Act") 1
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the -1934 Act")22 in
Congressional
response to the 1929 stock market crash.?
investigations subsequent to the 1929 crash revealed that a variety of
15. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994); infra note 29 and accompanying text.
16. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (Supp. 1997); infra notes 265, 315 and
accompanying text; see also Daniel L. Berger & Lisa K. Buckser, Loss Causation in
Federal Securities Litigation Impact on Accountants' Liability, in Financial Fraud in
Public Companies, at 473, 475 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series
No. B-1115, 1999) (stating that the PSLRA recently codified the burden of proving
loss causation in Rule 10b-5 cases); Lawrence A. Steckman & Robert E. Conner, Loss
When Should
Causation Under Rule 10B-5 A Circuit-By-Circuit Analysis:
RepresentationalMisconduct Be Deemed the Cause of Legal Injury Under the Federal
Securities Laws?, in How to Prepare an Initial Public Offering 1998. at 375, 397 (PLI
Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-1068, 1998) (noting that the
PSLRA codified loss causation by making it an element in 1934 Act violations).
17. See infra Part III.
18. See infra Part IV.
19. See infra Part I.A.
20. See infra Part I.B.
21. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1994).
22. See id §§ 78a-7811.
23. See Hazen, supra note 1, at 7.
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manipulative and deceptive trading practices existed in the securities
market prior to the crash, which significantly contributed to the
market's collapse.24 Thus, reform was necessary to prevent future
market disasters, restore investor confidence in the market, and
rejuvenate the economy.'
To achieve these purposes, Congress drafted the 1933 and 1934
Acts. Both acts contained provisions designed to improve the
accuracy of securities information and deter fraud.26 The 1933 Act
primarily concentrated on the distribution of securities.27 The 1934
Act was a broader and more "omnibus regulation" that increased
investor protections and significantly extended the scope of the 1933
Act.' The general antifraud provision of the 1934 Act can be found
in section 10(b), which states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the
mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security registered on a national securities exchange or any
security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.29
Essentially, section 10(b) makes it unlawful for persons to use
"manipulative or deceptive" practices "in connection with the
purchase or sale of' securities in violation of rules promulgated by the
"Commission."3" The "Commission" is the Securities and Exchange
Commission (the "SEC"), which Congress established in conjunction
with the 1934 Act.31

In 1942, pursuant to its authority under section 10(b), the SEC
promulgated Rule 10b-5 to further combat securities fraud. 3 Rule
10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
24. See Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 385, 410-13 (1990).
25. See Millisor, supra note 8, at 627.
26. See Hazen, supra note 1, at 7.
27. See id.
28. Id. at 7-8. Unlike the 1933 Act, the 1934 Act regulates all aspects of public
securities trading, covers both the purchasers and sellers of securities, and sets forth
registration and reporting requirements for the issuers of securities. See id. at 8.
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
30. Id.
31. See Hazen, supra note 1, at 7-8.
32. See James D. Cox et al., Securities Regulation: Cases and Materials 681 (2d
ed. 1997).
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use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of
the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
[a] To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
[b] To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
[c] To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any3 person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Thus, the SEC designed Rule 10b-5 to eliminate: (1) fraudulent
schemes, (2) material misstatements, (3) material omissions where a
duty to disclose exists, and (4) fraudulent acts. -'
In creating Rule 10b-5, the SEC constructed "a powerful antifraud
weapon"'35 that has become "[t]he principal tool for promoting the
informational integrity of securities transactions. "'
Rule 10b-5
broadened the scope of the SEC's enforcement authority in public
actions3 7 and has become the principal means used by private
investors to recover for fraudulent misconduct in private actions.'8
Although the rule did not expressly give investors a right to a private
remedy, in 1946 a federal district court held that a private cause of
action could be implied from the rule.39 Other districts and circuits
followed that holding. Twenty-four years later, the Supreme Court
formally upheld an implied private right of action in Superintendent of
Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.4°
B.

The Requisite Elements in a Rule JOb-5 Private Cause of Action

As use of the Rule 10b-5 private cause of action increased, it
became necessary for courts to formulate the specific requirements
and limitations of the Rule. Because a statute expressly outlining the
private cause of action did not exist, courts turned to common law tort
principles for guidance.4 ' Applying general common law principles to
a wide variety of securities transactions was a difficult endeavor and
created a great deal of ambiguity and uncertainty 2 As a result, courts
33. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1998).
34. See id
35. Hazen, supra note 1, at 669.
36. Cox et al., supra note 32, at 681.
37. See id. at 681-82. Because Rule 10b-5 can be used against both the buyers and
sellers of securities, it eliminated a loophole created by section 17(a) of the 1933 Act,
15 U.S.C. § 77q (1994), which can only be used to combat fraud in connection with the
sale of securities. See idt
38. See Millisor supra note 8, at 628.
39. See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512,513-14 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
40. 404 U.S. 6, 13 & n.9 (1971).
41. See Herzog, supra note 7, at 360.
42. See Kaufman, Material World, supra note 8, at 1-3; Millisor, supra note 8, at
628-29.
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subjected the Rule 10b-5 private action to constant revision.43
Although the Supreme Court recognized "a judicial authority to
shape, within limits, the 10b-5 cause of action,"" the Court addressed
only certain Rule 10b-5 issues and never explicitly defined all of the
requisite elements in a Rule 10b-5 private action.45 Nevertheless, all
courts agree that a plaintiff bringing a private cause of action under
Rule 10b-5 must allege: (1) that the defendant, "in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security," (2) made a material
misstatement (or material omission where a duty to disclose exists) (3)
with scienter (4) that was justifiably relied on by the plaintiff (5) and
caused (6) the plaintiff to suffer damages.46
Because knowledge of all of the requisite elements in a Rule 10b-5
private cause of action is helpful in understanding how courts have
addressed loss causation, this section sets forth a brief description of
each of the elements.47
1.

"In connection with the purchase or sale of any security"

A plaintiff asserting a Rule 10b-5 claim for securities fraud must
first demonstrate that the injury occurred "in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security." 4s This is a statutory requirement

43. See Kaufman, MaterialWorld, supra note 8, at 1; Millisor, supra note 8, at 62829.
44. Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 508 U.S. 286, 293
(1993).
45. See Kaufman, Material World, supra note 8, at 1-2; Millisor, supra note 8, at
628-29. Furthermore, the Court has never even mentioned the terms "loss causation"
or "transaction causation." See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
46. See, e.g., Gasner v. Board of Supervisors, 103 F.3d 351, 356 (4th Cir. 1996)
(noting the elements that a plaintiff must prove in a Rule 10b-5 private cause of
action); see also John Kanberg & Tanya Herrera, PotentialLiabilities in Initial Public
Offerings, in 1 Securities Arbitration 1998, at 251, 280-84 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice
Course Handbook Series No. B-1061, 1998) (outlining the elements of a plaintiff's
burden of proof in a Rule 10b-5 private cause of action). In a private cause of action
for material omissions, the plaintiff would have the added burden of proving that the
defendant had a duty to disclose. See Kanberg & Herrera, supra, at 283-84.
Additionally, some of the requisite elements in a Rule 10b-5 private cause of action
are not requisite elements in an SEC enforcement action. See, e.g., SEC v. Rana
Research, Inc., 8 F.3d 1358, 1364 (9th Cir. 1993) (agreeing with the Sixth and Second
Circuits that reliance is not a requisite element in an SEC enforcement action); SEC
v. Hasho, 784 F. Supp. 1059, 1106 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (stating that establishing liability in
a Rule 10b-5 enforcement action requires the SEC to prove that the defendant used
jurisdictional means to make a material misstatement or omission with scienter in
connection with the purchase or sale of a security).
47. Examining all of the elements is also helpful because resolving the loss
causation controversy not only requires an understanding of loss causation, which
falls under the general element of causation, but also an understanding of damages.
See infra notes 336-41 and accompanying text.
48. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1998); supra note 33 and accompanying text; see also
supra note 46 and accompanying text (listing the requisite elements in a Rule 10b-5
private action).
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that arises directly from the text of Rule 10b-5.9 The Supreme Court
has interpreted the "in connection with" element broadly, holding
that a plaintiff can satisfy the element by simply demonstrating that
"deceptive practices touch[ed]" the securities transaction.51 The
Supreme Court has also held that only a defrauded purchaser or seller
of securities has standing to bring a private cause of action pursuant to
Rule 10b-5 due to the phrase "purchase or sale" in the rule's text."
Since the Court's holding, the lower federal courts have recognized
that Rule 10b-5 affords protection to such purchasers as: (1)
shareholders in shareholder derivative suits, - (2) trust beneficiaries, 3
(3) corporations in merger transactions, (4) pledgors of securities,5"
(5) pledgees of securities, 56 (6) record owners of securities,' and (7)
equitable owners of securities. 8 Thus, courts have adopted a flexible
approach to the purchaser/seller standing requirement of Rule 10b-5.so
49. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5; supra note 33 and accompanying text.

50. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6,12-13 (1971).
51. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 73149 (1975)
(adopting the ruling in Birnbaun v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952)).
52. See, eg., Ray v. Karris, 780 F.2d 636, 641 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting that a
shareholder's right to sue derivatively under Rule 10b-5 was established in Dasho r.
SusquehannaCorp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1967)).
53. See, e.g., Hackford v. First Sec. Bank of Utah, N.A., 521 F. Supp. 541, 549 (D.
Utah 1981) (finding that trust beneficiaries had standing to bring a private action
under Rule 10b-5 because they had a beneficial interest in the stock sold and were not
mere bystanders), aff'd, No. 81-1863, 1983 WL20180 (10th Cir. Jan. 31, 1983).
54. See, eg., Nanfito v. Tekseed Hybrid Co., 341 F. Supp. 240, 243 (D. Neb. 1972)
(stating that for purposes of section 10b, courts have held that a merger involves a
"purchase" or "sale"), affd, 473 F.2d 537 (8th Cir. 1973).
55. See, e.g., Madison Consultants v. FDIC. 710 F.2d 57, 60-61 (2d Cir. 1983)
(holding that the plaintiffs, who were pledgors of stock, had standing to sue under
Rule 10b-5 because Rule 10b-5 should be read flexibly).
56. See, e.g., Mallis v. FDIC, 568 F.2d 824, 829-30 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that
pledgees of securities have standing to sue under Rule lOb-5 because pledgees assume
a real investment risk in the pledged securities). But see, e.g., National Bank of
Commerce v. All American Assurance Co., 583 F.2d 1295, 1299-1300 (5th Cir. 1978)
(ruling that pledgees of securities do not constitute purchasers or sellers of securities
for purposes of Rule 10b-5 because pledgees have remedies on the note itself and thus
do not need the protection of the federal securities acts).
57. See, e.g., Goldstein v. Cytogen Corp., Civ. No. 92-3960 (CSF), 1993 WL
274246, at "1-'5 (D. N.J. June 7, 1993) (granting class certification to record owners of
common stock who had filed a class action pursuant to Rule lOb-5).
58. See, e.g., Mullen v. Sweetwater Dev. Corp., 619 F. Supp. 809, 814-16 (D. Colo.
1985) (concluding that the plaintiffs, as equitable interest holders in the stock, had
standing to bring a private action under Rule 10b-5).
59. Courts have even created a number of exceptions for plaintiffs who do not
directly qualify as purchasers or sellers of securities. For example, the -aborted
seller" rule would allow a Rule 10b-5 cause of action to be brought against a would-be
purchaser of securities. See Hazen, supra note 1, at 677. Some courts also allow
injunctive relief under Rule 10b-5 regardless of whether the person seeking equitable
relief was a purchaser or seller of securities. See id. at 678-79. Additionally, under
certain circumstances, courts have considered the participants in transactions
involving contract rights or option contracts as purchasers or holders of securities. See
id.at 680-82.
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Materiality

A Rule 10b-5 plaintiff must also prove that the defendant's
fraudulent misconduct was material.' In a leading Rule 10b-5 case,
the Second Circuit clarified the meaning of materiality by looking to
the Restatement of Torts, which defined materiality in terms of
whether a reasonable person would have considered the
misrepresented fact an important factor when determining his course
of conduct with respect to the transaction. 1 Since then, the Supreme
Court has ruled that under Rule 10b-5 "materiality depends on the
significance the reasonable investor would place on the withheld or
misrepresented information."6' 2 Thus, materiality requires a highly
factual inquiry and can be difficult to predict.63
3.

Scienter

Another element that a plaintiff must satisfy is scienter. 64
Influenced by the legislative history and text of both section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5, the Court in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder65 resolved
twenty years of conflicting cases by holding that Rule 10b-5 requires a
plaintiff to prove that the defendant acted with scienter. 66 The Court
defined scienter as "a mental state embracing intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud," 67 and it opined that the drafters of section
10(b) embraced the scienter element because the words "any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" suggest that section
10(b) was intended to proscribe only intentional misconduct. 68 Since
then, the Court has also ruled that the scienter requirement applies to
SEC enforcement actions. 69 No Supreme Court case, however, has
addressed whether a plaintiff can establish scienter by showing
reckless conduct.7"
As a result, federal courts have developed
60. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1998); supra note 33 and accompanying text; see
also supra note 46 and accompanying text (listing the requisite elements in a Rule
10b-5 private action).
61. See List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1965).
62. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,240 (1988); see also infra notes 134-44 and
accompanying text (discussing Basic). In Basic the Supreme Court applied the test it
developed in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976). See Basic,
485 U.S. at 238-40. In TSC the Supreme Court held that under Rule 14a-9 "fain
omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote." TSC, 426 U.S. at
449.
63. See Hazen, supra note 1, at 693.
64. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
65. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
66. See id. at 193-214; see also Hazen, supra note 1, at 683 (noting that after twenty
years of conflicting cases, the Supreme Court defined scienter in Ernst).
67. Ernst, 425 U.S. at 193-94 n.12.
68. Id. at 195 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994) (internal quotations omitted)).

69. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 691-95 (1980).
70. See Hazen, supra note 1, at 685. Under certain circumstances, recklessness
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different rules on the specificity requirements for pleading scienter.7t
4. Reliance
A plaintiff must also demonstrate that he justifiably relied on the

defendant's fraudulent misconduct. 7

For many years, lower courts

have applied the common law fraud test of reliance to Rule 10b-5
private actions.73 The common law fraud test requires a plaintiff to
prove that the defendant's fraud was a substantial factor in
determining the course of conduct that resulted in the plaintiff's loss! 4
Although the Supreme Court has agreed with lower courts "that
reliance is an element of a Rule 10b-5 cause of action,"75 it has also
held that positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery in
cases involving fraudulent omissions or fraud on the market.76 Thus,
unless a case falls into one of those two categories, the plaintiff has the
burden of proving reliance.

constitutes scienter in a common law action for fraud or deceit. See id. at 685 & n.14.
71. See Steven B. Rosenfeld, Pleading Scienter Under the Private Securities

Litigation Reform Act of 1995, in 2 30th Annual Institute on Securities Regulation, at

791, 794 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-1085, 1998).
Congress added section 21D(b)(2) to the 1934 Act, Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, tit. 1, sec. 101(b), § 21D(b)(2), 109 Stat. 737
(1995) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (Supp. 1997)), via the PSLRA in order to
resolve this circuit split; however, "imprecise drafting and conflicting legislative
history have resulted in continuing disagreement among federal courts over the
proper interpretation of the provision." Ryan G. Miest, Note, Would the Real Scienter
PleaseStand Up: The Effect of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 on
Pleading Securities Fraud, 82 Minn. L. Rev. 1103, 1106 (1998). While some courts
"interpret [section 21D(b)(2)] ...as merely codifying the Second Circuit's standard,
which held that pleading recklessness or 'motive and opportunity' is sufficient for
pleading scienter," other courts "interpret [section 21D(b)(2)] to be more stringent
than the Second Circuit's approach." Laura R. Smith, Comment, The Battle Between
Plain Meaning and Legislative History: Which Will Decide the Standardfor Pleading
ScienterAfter the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995?, 39 Santa Clara L
Rev. 577, 578-579 (1999). Therefore, even after the passage of the PSLRA, federal
courts disagree on whether recklessness satisfies the pleading standard for scienter.
See id at 586.
72. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
73. See, e.g., List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457,462-63 (2d Cir. 1965) (setting
forth the test for reliance in a Rule 10b-5 private action based on the common law
fraud test as defined in the Restatement (First) of Torts § 546 (1938)).
74. See id.
75. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,243 (1988); see also infra notes 134-44 and
accompanying text (discussing Basic).
76. See id. at 247 (holding that a rebuttable presumption of reliance exists in
fraud-on-the-market cases because investors who buy or sell securities at the market
price rely on the integrity of that price); Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United
States, 406 U.S. 128, 152-54 (1972) (ruling that proof of reliance is not required in
fraudulent omissions cases because in such cases proof of materiality sufficiently
establishes causation in fact). For a more detailed discussion of Basic, see infra Part
II.B.
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Causation

To satisfy the element of causation, a plaintiff must prove both
transaction and loss causation. 7 Courts have defined transaction
causation as the causal connection between a defendant's fraud and a
plaintiffs engagement in the transaction in question. 8 Some courts
have also characterized transaction causation as a form of "but for"
causation 9 Although a plaintiff can establish transaction causation
by proving that the transaction would not have occurred but for the
defendant's fraud, transaction causation only requires a plaintiff to
demonstrate that the defendant's fraudulent misconduct affected the
terms of the resulting transaction.8" Generally, courts have taken a
broad approach to transaction causation and some courts have even
stated that it is "merely another way of describing reliance." 8 '
Loss causation, on the other hand, which courts have defined as the
causal connection between a defendant's fraud and a plaintiff's
injury," is the source of much controversy and confusion. 83 While
some courts view loss causation as a form of proximate causation and
utilize traditional proximate causation tests in loss causation
analyses," other courts have adopted a broader approach to loss
causation and allow the loss causation requirement to be satisfied by
proof of "some causal nexus" between a plaintiff's pecuniary loss and
a defendant's fraudulent misconduct."
Thus, the burden that a
plaintiff must overcome to satisfy loss causation varies with each
jurisdiction.
6.

Damages

Under Rule 10b-5, a plaintiffs recovery is limited to actual
damages. 6 To assess actual damages, courts have adopted three
77. See, e.g., Binder v. Gillespie, 184 F.3d 1059, 1065 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that
the causation requirement under Rule 10b-5 includes both transaction and loss
causation), cert. denied, No. 99-742, 2000 WL 197407 (Feb. 22, 2000).
78. See Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374,380 (2d Cir. 1974).
79. See, e.g., Ambassador Hotel Co. v. Wei-Chuan Inv., 189 F.3d 1017, 1027 (9th
Cir. 1999) (stating that establishing transaction causation requires the plaintiff to
prove that "but for the fraud, the plaintiff would not have engaged in the transaction
at issue"); Trident Inv. Management, Inc. v. Amoco Oil Co., 194 F.3d 772, 778 (7th
Cir. 1999) (referring to transaction causation as "but for" causation).
80. See Hazen, supra note 1, at 703-04.
81. Hazen, supra note 1, at 703 (quoting Harris v. Union Elec. Co., 787 F.2d 355,
366 (8th Cir. 1986) (internal quotations omitted)).
82. See Schlick, 507 F.2d at 380.
83. See Hazen, supra note 1, at 704-10; see also infra Part II (consisting of a
comprehensive discussion of loss causation).
84. See infra notes 163, 179.
85. See infra notes 230-33 and accompanying text.
86. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e) (Supp. 1997); infra note 336 and accompanying text.
Actual damages are damages "actually and proximately caused by the violations in
question." Hazen, supra note 1, at 713. Punitive damages are not available in a Rule
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different approaches: (1) the benefit-of-the-bargain method; (2)
rescission; and (3) the out-of-pocket rule. 7 The benefit-of-the-bargain
method is essentially a contract remedy that is based on breach of
Some courts have permitted benefit-of-the-bargain
promise.'
damages in the broker/customer context,1 and at least one court has
adopted the benefit-of-the-bargain method in a tender offer case.'

Rescission, on the other hand, is typically reserved for cases involving

fraud in the inducement, 9' where the plaintiff seeks to be restored to
the status quo.' Lastly, the out-of-pocket rule is commonly used in

cases where the defendant's fraud artificially altered the value of the
plaintiff's investment.93 The out-of-pocket rule has traditionally been
the most commonly used approach in Rule 10b-5 private actions.
Under the out-of-pocket rule, damages are based on the difference

between the transaction price and the actual value of the security at
the time of the transaction. 95 The Supreme Court, however, has never

endorsed a specific methodology for calculating out-of-pocket
damages, and as a result experts have utilized two different

approaches to determine the "value line" 96 against which a company's
actual stock price is compared.' The "constant ribbon," or "price
reaction," method measures the difference between the stock price
prior to the "curative disclosure"9 " and the stock price subsequent to

10b-5 action unless the plaintiff brings a common law fraud claim in the same action
pursuant to the doctrine of pendant jurisdiction. See id.
87. See Hazen, supra note 1, at 714-16.
at 715.
88. See id.
89. See, e.g., Medical Assocs. of Hamburg, P.C. v. Advest, Inc., No. CIV-85-837E,
1989 WL 75142, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. July 5, 1989) (awarding damages based on increase
in relevant market index).
90. See Osofsky v. Zipf, 645 F.2d 107, 114 (2d Cir. 1981) (stating that -the benefitof-the-bargain rule should be applied under the 1934 Act to the limited situation...
where misrepresentation is made in the tender offer and proxy solicitation materials
as to the consideration to be forthcoming upon an intended merger"), appeal after
remand 725 F.2d 1057 (2d Cir. 1984).
91. Fraud in the inducement cases are cases in which the plaintiff "would not have
entered into the transaction but for the defendant's fraud." Hazen, supra note 1, at
715.
92. See id.; Steckman & Conner, supra note 16, at 398 n.59.
93. See Hazen, supra note 1, at 715-16.
94. See id. at 714-17; Michael J. Kaufman, Securities Litigation: Damages § 1B:07,
at 13 (West 1999) [hereinafter Kaufman, Damages]; Jonathan C. Dickey & Marcia
Kramer Mayer, Effect on Rule lob-5 Damages of the 1995 Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act" A Forward-Looking Assessment, 51 Bus. Law. 1203, 1203 (1996);
Steckman & Conner supra note 16, at 321 n.122.
95. See Kaufman, Damages, supra note 94, § 1B:07, at 13.
96. The value line is the price that a stock would have been over a period of time
if there had been no fraud.
97. See Dickey & Mayer, supra note 94, at 1203-04; Kaufman, Damages, supra
note 94, § 1B:07, at 14.
98. Curative disclosure refers to the time at which the market is informed of the
fraud.
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the "curative disclosure." 99 This method only permits recovery by
plaintiffs who purchased and retained shares during the class period.'0°
The "constant true value method," on the other hand, calculates the
difference between the price paid for the stock and the true value of

the stock. 10 ' The true value of the stock for the entire class period is
presumed to be the price of the stock following the "curative

disclosure."'" Under the "constant true value method," it is possible
for "in and out"103 investors to recover. 104
In response to the uncertainties and complexities involved in
damage calculations under Rule 10b-5, Congress added section
21D(e) 10 5 to the 1934 Act via the PSLRA. 4° Generally, section
21D(e) limits damages in certain securities cases to the difference
between the purchase price paid for the security and the mean trading
price of that security during a ninety-day look-back period."' 7 Section
21D(e) does not replace or endorse any of the damage calculation
methods or rules. l 8 Rather, it limits recovery under those various
methods and rules."° Although Congress intended section 21D(e) to
reduce the overestimation of plaintiffs' damages in certain securities
cases, 1 0 a number of scholars have asserted that due to certain

ambiguities contained in section 21D(e), the new provision "will have,
at most, a modest impact in... future cases.""'

Because Rule 10b-5 is a powerful antifraud weapon that enables
private investors to recover for securities fraud, ambiguity as to the
elements of a Rule 10b-5 action can have serious financial
99. See Kaufman, Damages, supra note 94, § 1B:07, at 14-15. For example, "if an
investor buys at $20 a share and the stock appreciates to $25 but then goes to $15 a
share after a disclosure ....Under the constant ribbon method, value as measured by
the price reaction is $10 [($25 -$15 = $10)]." Id. § 1B:07, at 15.
100. See id. § 1B:07, at 14-15.
101. See id.§ 1B:07, at 15.
102. See id. For example, "if an investor buys at $20 a share and the stock
appreciates to $25 but then goes to $15 a share after a disclosure, under the constant
true value model, the damages are the difference between the price paid and the true
value ($20 - $15 = $5)." Id.
103. "In and out" investors are investors who sold their stock prior to the curative
disclosure.
104. Kaufman, Damages, supra note 94, § 1B:07, at 15.
105. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, tit. 1,
sec. 101(b), § 21D(e), 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e) (Supp.
1997)).
106. See S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 19-20 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679,
698-99; H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-369, at 42 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
679, 741.
107. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e) (Supp. 1997); infra note 336 and accompanying text.
108. See Kaufman, Damages, supra note 94, § 1B:07, at 18.
109. See id. For an example of how section 21D(e) would limit recovery under
both the "constant ribbon method" and "constant true value method," see id., §
1B:07, at 15-16.
110. See supra note 106.
111. Dickey & Mayer, supra note 94, at 1219; see also Kaufman, Damages, supra
note 94, § 1B:07, at 14 (quoting Dickey & Mayer, supra note 94, at 1219).
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consequences. Arriving at a cohesive and uniform approach to loss
causation would therefore further the goals of securities laws in
protecting investors and punishing fraudulent acts. The next part
discusses the historical development of loss causation and illustrates
how various courts have approached its analysis.
II. Loss CAUSATION

This part reviews the origin of loss causation and investigates
Supreme Court jurisprudence touching on causation and related
issues. It then explores in detail the federal case law on loss causation
and sets forth the analytical intricacies involved in the various loss
causation approaches.
A. The Origin of Loss Causation
Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp."2 was the first case to ever
make a distinction between transaction causation and loss causation." 3
Prior to Schlick, courts had satisfied principals of causation through
the element of reliance,"' which was directly in line with notions of
common law fraud. 15 In Schlick, the plaintiff, who owned stock in
Continental Cement Corporation, argued that Penn-Dixie's fraud
caused him to receive a less favorable exchange ratio when a merger
was effectuated between Penn-Dixie and Continental." 6 Penn-Dixie
contended that because the plaintiff was a minority shareholder, he
could not have prevented the merger, and thus could not have relied
on the misrepresentation." 7 The court disagreed and articulated its
reasoning by dividing its causation analysis into two parts: "loss
causation" and "transaction causation.""'
The court defined loss
causation as the causal connection between the defendant's fraud and
the plaintiff's injury," 9 and transaction causation as the causal
connection between the defendant's fraud and the plaintiff's
engagement in the transaction in question. 2 The court then stated
that loss causation was "demonstrated rather easily, by proof of some
form of economic damage, here the unfair exchange ratio."'2 '

The

112. 507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1974).
113. See id. at 380-81; see also Kaufman, Exposing Fraud,supra note 6, at 360-61
(discussing Schlick).
114. See, e.g., List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457,462-63 (2d Cir. 1965) (stating
that reliance should be required because in a Rule lOb-5 private action causation-infact is a basic element of tort law).
115. See Restatement (First) of Torts § 546 (1938); William L Prosser, Law of
Torts § 89, at 550 (Hornbook Series, 2d ed. 1955).
116. See Schlick, 507 F.2d at 376.
117. See id. at 382.
118. Id. at 380-81.

119. See id. at 380.
120. See id.
121. Id.
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court further posited that transaction causation was unnecessary in
cases where the plaintiff alleges "market manipulation and a merger
on preferential terms."1" Ironically, the court's desire to clarify
ambiguity surrounding transaction causation created the even more
confusing element of loss causation.
After Schlick, courts gradually began to incorporate loss causation
into the framework of Rule 10b-5 analyses. But recognition of the
element did not come without its difficulties. Courts have referred to
loss causation as "ungainly, exotic, confusing, and even unhappy."'' m
One reason for the turmoil surrounding loss causation is that many
courts have viewed it as a form of proximate cause, 124 an area of
common law torts that has historically induced a great deal of
debate."2 Furthermore, common law fraud cases have typically
examined causation through the element of reliance and have not
26
directly required plaintiffs to address proximate cause concerns.
Only common law negligence cases have clearly distinguished7
between cause in fact ("but for") and legal cause ("proximate").
Thus, by dividing causation analysis into loss causation and
transaction causation, courts have adopted an approach more similar
to the one used in common law negligence cases. This tends to be
confusing because a Rule 10b-5 cause of action is an action
against
2
securities fraud, which is more akin to common law fraud. 1
B.

Supreme CourtJurisprudence

Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly referred to
122. Id. at 381.
123. Kaufman, Exposing Fraud, supra note 6, at 357 (quoting various cases
(internal quotations omitted)).
124. In negligence cases, proximate cause has been defined as "the primary moving
cause without which [the injury] would not have been inflicted, and which in the
natural and probable sequence of events, without the intervention of any new and
independent cause, produces the injury." Winona v. Botzet, 169 F. 321, 328 (8th Cir.
1909). It has also been defined as "[t]hat act or omission which immediately causes or
fails to prevent the injury; an act or omission occurring or concurring with another,
which, had it not happened, the injury would not have been inflicted." Black's Law
Dictionary 1225-26 (6th ed. 1990) (quoting Herron v. Smith Bros., 2 P.2d 1012, 1013
(Cal Ct. App. 1931) (internal quotations omitted)).
125. See Steckman & Conner, supra note 16, at 382-84.
126. See, e.g., Athey Prods. Corp. v. Harris Bank Roselle, 89 F. 3d 430,434 (7th Cir.
1996) (stating that "the elements of common law fraud are: (1) a false statement of
material fact; (2) by one who knows or believes it to be false; (3) made with the intent
to induce action by another in reliance on the statement; (4) action by the other in
reliance on the truthfulness of the statement; and (5) injury to the other resulting
from that reliance").
127. See, e.g., Krauss v. Greenbarg, 137 F.2d 569, 572 (3d Cir. 1943) (asserting that
for something which is a cause in fact to be a "legal cause" it must have been a
substantial factor in bringing about the injury).
128. Additionally, common law fraud principles have guided courts in formulating
other elements in Rule 10b-5, such as materiality, scienter, and reliance. See Hazen,
supra note 1, at 689.
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"transaction causation" or "loss causation," the Court has addressed
certain causation issues through the elements of materiality and
reliance.129 Additionally, the Court has consistently analyzed
causation by examining the value of a plaintiff's investment at the
time of the transaction, and the Court has placed little emphasis on
post-transaction investment value. 0 Although this analysis is
consistent with the minority view of loss causation, which permits loss
causation to be established without reference to post-transaction
investment value,3 it does not establish the Court's support for the

minority view because in each case, except for Basic Inc. v.
Levinson,132 post-transaction investment value was irrelevant because
it was not being used to measure recoverable loss.'33 As for the
Court's decision in Basic, which comes closest to touching on loss
causation-related issues, it too fails to endorse either the minority or
majority view for reasons discussed below.
The premise of the plaintiffs' allegations in Basic was that the
defendant's fraudulent denials of their involvement in merger
negotiations artificially depressed market prices and caused the
plaintiffs to lose money when they sold their stock shortly after the
defendant's first public misstatement.'- The plaintiffs used the posttransaction tender offer price of $46 per share as evidence to support
their contention that Basic's stock price at the time of the transaction
was artificially depressed.135
Although the plaintiffs used the post-transaction price increase in
the stock as evidence of their damages, whether the post-transaction
price increase was connected to the defendant's fraud was not at issue.
Such a connection was evident because the price increase was directly
set by the tender offer, which was the direct result of the merger
negotiations that the defendant misrepresented. What was not
129. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988) (holding that reliance
provides the causal connection between a defendant's fraud and a plaintiff's injury);

Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972) (ruling
that in fraudulent omissions cases, proof of materiality sufficiently establishes

causation in fact); see also Kaufman, Exposing Fraud, supra note 6, at 372-79
(discussing Supreme Court jurisprudence on causation).
130. See e.g., Ute, 406 U.S. at 154-56 (focusing on the effects of the fraud at the
time of the transaction and not on the post-transaction performance of the stock); see
also Kaufman, Exposing Fraud,supra note 6, at 373-74 (arguing that Supreme Court

reasoning in certain cases suggests that plaintiffs need only demonstrate a causal
connection between the defendant's misconduct and the injury suffered at the time of
the transaction).
131. For a detailed discussion of the difference between the majority and minority
views, see infra Part II.C.
132. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
133. See, e.g., Ute, 406 U.S. at 154-55 (measuring damages based on the difference

between the value the plaintiffs' received at the time of the transaction and the fair
value of what the plaintiffs should have received had there been no fraud).
134. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 228.

135. See id
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evident, however, was whether the plaintiffs sold their stock in
reliance on the defendant's fraudulent misstatements. Thus, the court
focused its attention on the element of reliance.
In its discussion of reliance, the Court also touched upon causation
issues, stating that reliance provides the "requisite causal connection"
between a plaintiff's loss and a defendant's fraud and that there is
more than one way for a plaintiff to demonstrate a "causal
connection. 1 36 This language suggests that the Court was adopting a
broad view of causation.
With respect to the reliance issue, the Court held that a rebuttable37
presumption of reliance exists in fraud-on-the-market cases.1
According to the Court,
[t]he fraud on the market theory is based on the hypothesis that, in
an open and developed securities market, the price of a company's
stock is determined by the available material information regarding
the company and its business.... Misleading statements will
therefore defraud purchasers of stock
even if the purchasers do not
138
directly rely on the misstatements.
The Court concluded that to rebut the presumption of reliance a
defendant would have to sever the causal link and prove that the
fraud did not distort the stock price or that the plaintiff sold or would
139
have sold the stock despite his knowing of the defendant's fraud.
Some courts interpreted Basic as also creating a presumption of loss
causation. 40 These courts assert that in fraud-on-the-market cases,
causation is established by the simple fact that a plaintiff relied on the
integrity of a price that had been artificially altered by the defendant's
fraud at the time of the transaction.'
Other courts, however,
maintain that proof of loss causation is still required. 42 They argue
that fraud-on-the-market theory supports only a rebuttable
presumption of reliance and not a presumption of causation. 43 These
136. Id. at 243.
137. See id. at 247.
138. Id. at 241-42 (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160-61 (3d Cir. 1986)).
139. See id. at 248.
140. See, e.g., In re Control Data Corp. Sec. Litig., 933 F.2d 616, 619-20 (8th Cir.
1991) (holding that causation is presumed to the extent that the defendant's fraud
altered the stock price and defrauded the market); see also Howard 0. Godnick &
Bridget Calhoun, Loss Causation: A Defendant's Secret Weapon, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 24,
1997, at 1 (explaining that some courts allow a presumption of loss causation in fraudon-the-market cases).
141. See Control Data Corp., 933 F.2d at 619-20.
142. See, e.g., Robbins v. Koger Properties, Inc., 116 F.3d 1441, 1448 (11th Cir.
1997) (ruling that the Supreme Court's articulation of the fraud-on-the-market theory
supports a rebuttable presumption of reliance, but not a rebuttable presumption of
causation); see also Godnick & Calhoun, supra note 140, at 1 (citing Robbins as a
recent example of a case in which a court ruled that loss causation is not presumed in
fraud-on-the-market cases).

143. See Robbins, 116 F.3d at 1448.
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courts reason that Basic did not alter loss causation analysis as
developed by the lower courts because reliance is related to
transaction causation, not loss causation." Thus, Basic heightened
the division between the competing notions of loss causation and
made reaching of a unified understanding of loss causation more
important.
Although the Supreme Court has arguably adopted a broad view of
causation, the Court has never directly addressed loss causation.
Instead, the Court has only touched upon causation issues through its
discussions of other elements.1 45 The Court has thus failed to provide
lower courts with a guiding rule for loss causation analysis.
M

C. Majority v. Minority View of Loss Causation
The majority of circuits view loss causation in narrow terms.116
These circuits require a plaintiff to specifically identify how the
defendant's fraud caused the alleged loss."4 7 Under the majority view,
a plaintiff who uses post-transaction investment value to measure
recoverable loss must establish a connection between the posttransaction investment value and the defendant's fraud." s The
minority view defines loss causation in broader terms and allows a
plaintiff to satisfy the loss causation requirement by establishing a
general connection between the alleged loss and the defendant's
fraud. 149 Under the minority view, a plaintiff who uses posttransaction investment value to measure recoverable loss does not
necessarily have to link the defendant's fraud to the post-transaction
investment value."0 The plaintiff can establish loss causation by
simply demonstrating that the defendant's fraud was in some way
responsible for artificially altering the transaction price.,
It is
therefore easier for plaintiffs in minority-view jurisdictions to satisfy
144. See id.
145. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
146. See infra notes 163,179,207.
147. See infra notes 163,179,207.

148. See infra notes 163, 179, 207; see also Berger & Buckser, supra note 16, at 47678 (discussing cases in which courts have examined loss causation by determining
whether a defendant's fraud touched upon reasons for the investment's price decline);
Godnick & Calhoun, supra note 140, at 1 (stating that some courts require plaintiffs
to prove that the defendant's fraud caused a post-transaction drop in the price of their
investment).
149. See infra note 233.

150. See infra note 233; see also Berger & Buckser, supra note 16, at 478-79
(explaining that in some jurisdictions plaintiffs can establish loss causation by proving
that the defendant's fraud artificially altered the investment price at the time of the
transaction); Godnick & Calhoun, supra note 140, at 1 (noting that certain courts
allow plaintiffs to satisfy the loss causation requirement by showing that the
investment price on the purchase date was artificially inflated because of the
defendant's fraud).
151. See infra note 233.
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the loss causation requirement.
1. Majority View
Under the majority view, there are three distinct approaches to loss
causation: (1) the direct causation approach; 152 (2) the foreseeability
54
approach;'53 and (3) the materialization-of-the-risk approach.
The direct causation approach is the most rigid of the three
approaches, focusing exclusively on whether a defendant's fraud
directly caused the plaintiff's alleged loss.'55 Plaintiffs who use posttransaction investment value to measure recoverable loss must prove
that the post-transaction investment value was directly linked to the
defendant's fraud.'5 6

This approach emphasizes the need for a

' 157
plaintiff to establish an unbroken "chain of causation.'
The foreseeability approach, on the other hand, is the most flexible
of the three approaches. Under the foreseeability approach, a
plaintiff must prove that at the time of the transaction it was
reasonably foreseeable that the defendant's fraud would cause the
alleged injury.'58 Plaintiffs who use post-transaction investment value
to measure recoverable loss must demonstrate that the posttransaction loss was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the

defendant's fraud. 159

Finally, the materialization-of-the-risk approach, which is less strict
than the direct causation approach, but stricter than the foreseeability
approach, requires plaintiffs to prove that the materialization of an
undisclosed risk caused the alleged loss."6 A plaintiff who uses posttransaction investment value to measure recoverable loss must show
that the defendant exposed him to an undisclosed risk at the time of
the transaction and that the post-transaction
loss resulted from the
61
materialization of that undisclosed risk.'
It is important to note that use of one approach does not necessarily
preclude the use of another. Direct causation is strong evidence of
both foreseeability and materialization of an undisclosed risk. Thus,
courts that follow the foreseeability approach or the materializationof-the-risk approach would probably allow a plaintiff to establish loss
152. See infra note 163; see also Steckman & Conner, supra note 16, at 411-13

(describing
153. See
(describing
154. See
(describing

the direct causation approach).
infra note 179; see also Steckman & Conner, supra note 16, at 412
the foreseeability approach).
infra note 207; see also Steckman & Conner, supra note 16, at 412
the materialization-of-the-risk approach).

155. See infra note 163.
156. See infra note 163.

157. Steckman & Conner, supra note 16, at 411-12.
158.
159.
160.
161.

See infra note
See infra note
See infra note
See infra note

179.
179.
207.
207.
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causation by satisfying the direct causation approach.' 6
a. The Direct CausationApproach
The direct causation approach is the strictest approach to loss
causation. Under the direct causation approach, the burden of proof
for a plaintiff is the most onerous because he must demonstrate that
his economic harm was directly caused by the defendant's fraud. The
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits have all utilized the direct
causation approach. 163 These courts have examined the issue of loss
causation by focusing on the sequence of events that occurred
between the defendant's fraudulent misconduct and the plaintiff's
alleged injury. 6 4
A recent example of a case that illustrates a court's use of the direct
causation approach is Robbins v. Koger Properties, Inc.'6 Robbins
involved a class action suit filed against a corporation, its officers, and
its accounting firm.16 According to plaintiffs, fraudulent financial

statements artificially inflated Koger Properties, Inc.'s ("KPI") stock

price. 67 Plaintiffs evidenced the price inflation by maintaining that
"an adjustment in the stated amount of cash flow in July 1989, the
beginning of the class period, would have required KPI to cut or
eliminate its dividend, causing a $10.05 decline in KPI's stock price
like the decline that occurred in October 1990."'
The Eleventh
Circuit found that this was not enough to satisfy the loss causation
requirement and stated that proof of an artificially inflated price,
without more, does not satisfy the loss causation requirement." The

162- See infra notes 202, 228 and accompanying text.
163. See, eg., Robbins v. Koger Properties, Inc., 116 F.3d 1441, 1447 (lth Cir.
1997) (ruling that loss causation requires a plaintiff to prove that the defendant's
fraud directly or proximately caused the investment's decline in value); Carlton v.
Franklin, 911 F.2d 721, Nos. 89-2942 & 89-2972 to 89-2974, 1990 WL 116788, at *4-5
(4th Cir. Aug. 2, 1990) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision) (holding that loss
causation required the plaintiffs to prove that the defendants' fraud "in some
reasonably direct way, 'touch[ed] upon' the reason for the investment's decline in
value" and explaining that a strict approach to loss causation prevents the federal
securities laws from becoming an insurance program for investors (quoting
Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534,549 (5th Cir. 1981), affd in partand
rev'd in parton other grounds,459 U.S. 375 (1983))); Campbell v. Shearson/American
Express Inc., 829 F.2d 38, Nos. 85-1703, 85-1714, 1987 WL 44742, at *2 (6th Cir. Sept.
9, 1987) (unpublished table decision) (finding that the plaintiff's argument failed to
make a distinction between reliance and causation and that the plaintiff never
demonstrated that the defendant's fraud directly caused a decline in the value of the
investment).
164. See supra note 163; see also Steckman & Conner, supra note 16, at 411-12
(discussing the direct causation approach).
165. 116 F.3d 1441 (11th Cir. 1997).
166. See id. at 1441-42.
167. See id. at 1446.
168. Id. at 1446-47.
169. See id. at 1448.
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court concluded that plaintiffs failed to prove loss causation because
they never provided "evidence that [the] price inflation was removed
from the market price of KPI stock."' 170
According to the court, the plaintiff's actual loss was the decline in
the price of their stock, which was caused by the company's cut in
their dividend and not the fraudulent financial statements. 7 1 The
court expressly rejected Eighth and Ninth Circuit precedent, stating
that those courts had incorrectly merged reliance and loss causation
into one analysis and that reliance and loss causation should be
treated as distinct elements.
The Eleventh Circuit further asserted
that proving loss causation requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that the
defendant's fraud caused his loss "in some reasonably direct, or
proximate, way."' 73 Thus, in Robbins, the Eleventh Circuit examined
loss causation under the direct causation approach.
Campbell v. Shearson/American Express Inc.174 demonstrates direct
causation analysis in the context of a case involving fraudulent
inducement. In Campbell, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant
fraudulently induced him to enter into a risky investment in order to
earn higher and undisclosed commissions.Y
The defendant
contended that the plaintiff was an active investor who understood
and accepted the risks associated with his investments. 7 6 The Sixth
Circuit held that the plaintiff's argument failed to make a distinction
between reliance and causation, and that the plaintiff never proved
that the defendant's fraud caused his loss "in some reasonably direct,
or proximate, way.' ' 77 Thus, the plaintiff failed to establish loss
causation because he did not satisfy his burden under the direct
causation approach.
As these cases illustrate, courts utilizing the direct causation
approach require plaintiffs to prove a direct causal connection
between their pecuniary injury and the defendant's fraud. Under this
approach, plaintiffs carry the heaviest burden of proof.
b. The ForeseeabilityApproach
A second approach to loss causation is the foreseeability approach,
which is the most flexible approach under the majority view. Courts
using the foreseeability approach require plaintiffs to prove that their
170. Id.
171. See id. at 1448-49.
172. See id. at 1448.
173. Id. at 1447 (quoting Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 549
(5th Cir. 1981), affd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 459 U.S. 375 (1983)
(internal quotations omitted)).
174. Nos. 85-1703, 85-1714, 1987 WL 44742 (6th Cir. Sept. 9, 1987).
175. See id. at *1.
176. See id. at *2-*3.
177. Id. at *2 (citing Huddleston, 640 F.2d at 549).
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economic harm was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant's
fraud." 8 The foreseeability
approach has been utilized primarily by
179
the Second Circuit.
In re Blech Securities Litigation"s is an excellent example of a case
in which a court exclusively applied the foreseeability approach. In
Blech, plaintiffs brought a class action suit against the defendant
broker for allegedly using deceptive practices to manipulate the
market.181 The court advocated the foreseeability approach in finding
that the collapse in the price of the securities, which had been inflated
by the defendant's fraud, "was a foreseeable consequence" of the
defendant's fraud.Y
The underlying difference between the foreseeability approach and
the direct causation approach is best illustrated in Marbury
Management, Inc. v. Kohn.1 8 In Marbury, the defendant
misrepresented himself as a licensed stock broker and sold securities
to Marbury Management.'8 The court found that the defendant's
misrepresentation induced the plaintiffs not only to purchase the
securities, but also to retain them as the price declined.185 The court
noted that the length of time that the plaintiffs retained the securities
affected the extent of the plaintiffs' loss." Although the defendant's
fraud was not responsible for the actual decline in the stock price, the
court held that loss causation was established because the plaintiffs'
injury was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant's
fraud." Thus, the court applied the foreseeability approach.
Although the majority agreed with the dissent that the defendant,
who misrepresented himself as a licensed broker, should only be liable
for the losses that his fraud "proximately caused,"" s the majority
differed on its view of proximate cause and stated that:
[d]ifferentiating transaction causation from loss causation can be a
helpful analytical procedure only so long as it does not become a
new rule effectively limiting recovery for fraudulently induced
securities transactions to instances of fraudulent representations
about the value characteristics of the securities dealt in. So concise a
theory of liability for fraud would be too accommodative of many
178. See infra note 179; see also Steckman & Conner, supra note 16, at 412
(discussing the foreseeability approach).
179. See, eg., Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 708 (2d Cir. 1980)
(holding that loss causation "requires that the damage complained of be one of the
foreseeable consequences of the misrepresentation").
180. 961 F. Supp. 569 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
181. See id. at 576.
182. Id at 586.
183. 629 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1980).
184. See id. at 707.
185. See id. at 708.
186. See id.
187. See id. at 708-09.
188. Id. at 710 n.3.
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common types of fraud, such as189the misrepresentation of a collateral
fact that induces a transaction.
Essentially, the majority acknowledged that its loss causation
analysis blurred the distinction between loss causation and transaction
causation. However, the court saw this as an advantage and pointed
out that in some cases a sharp distinction would produce unjust
results. 90
Thus, the majority favored the flexibility of the
foreseeability approach over the rigidity of direct causation.
In contrast, Judge Meskill's dissenting opinion argued in support of
the direct causation approach. 19' Judge Meskill explained that a basic
principle of causation is that the plaintiffs injury must proceed
directly from the defendant's fraud and that fraud is not actionable in
cases where the subsequent loss occurs because of an intervening
cause."9 Judge Meskill additionally posited that:
if false statements are made in connection with the sale of corporate
stock, losses due to a subsequent decline of the market, or
insolvency of the corporation, brought about by business conditions
or other factors in no way related to the representations, will not
afford any basis for recovery. It is only where the fact misstated was
of a nature calculated to bring about such a result that damages for
it can be recovered1 93

Judge Meskill supported this contention with the public policy
rationale that defendants should not become the insurers of plaintiffs'
investments. 4
Marbury is an important case because it illustrates on one set of
facts how the foreseeability approach and the direct causation
approach can produce different results. The majority in Marbury
utilized the foreseeability approach and reached a more plaintifffriendly conclusion than did Judge Meskill. On a different set of facts,
however, the foreseeability approach and the direct causation
approach can produce the same result.195
For example, in Citibank, N.A. v. K-H Corp.,196 the Second Circuit
concluded that the plaintiff failed to establish causation in its Rule
10b-5 and New York common law fraud claims because it did not
prove that its injury was either a foreseeable consequence of the
defendants' fraud or a direct result of the defendants' fraud. 197 In
189. Id.
190. See id.
191. See id. at 716-18.
192. See id.
193. Id. at 718 (quoting William L. Prosser, Law of Torts § 110, at 732 (Hornbook
Series, 4th ed. 1971)).
194. See id. at 718.
195. See infra notes 196-201 and accompanying text.
196. 968 F.2d 1489 (2d Cir. 1992).
197. See id. at 1495-97.
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Citibank, plaintiff Citibank alleged that the defendants fraudulently
induced the bank to provide financing for a particular business
transaction by failing to disclose to Citibank that a note had been
substituted for a portion of a contribution that Citibank had required
to be in all cash." 8 Addressing Citibank's Rule 10b-5 claim, the court
found that Citibank did not prove loss causation because it failed to
indicate the cause of the investment's colapse. 199 The Second Circuit
ruled that loss causation requires a plaintiff to prove that his injury
was a "foreseeable consequence" of the defendant's fraud.2° With
respect to the common law fraud claim, the court held that Citibank
did not establish proximate causation because it failed to specify how
the alleged fraud "directly and proximately" caused the injury." t
Thus, this case illustrates how tests of foreseeability and direct
causation can sometimes lead a court to the same conclusion.
Under the majority view, the foreseeability approach is the most
Because direct causation is strong
plaintiff-friendly approach.
evidence of foreseeability, courts applying the foreseeability approach
allow plaintiffs to establish loss causation by either demonstrating
direct causation or foreseeability. 2°2 Direct causation, however, is not
required under the foreseeability approach. z Courts utilizing the
foreseeability approach require only that plaintiffs prove that their
loss was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant's fraudulent
misconduct.'
c. The Materialization-of-the-RiskApproach
The last majority-view approach is the materialization-of-the-risk
approach, 0 5 which is stricter than the foreseeability approach, but not
as strict as the direct causation approach. A court applying the
materialization-of-the-risk approach requires a plaintiff to prove that
his loss was caused by the materialization of a risk that was
undisclosed because of the defendant's fraud. 2 The Seventh Circuit
is the principal proponent of the materialization-of-the-risk

198. See id. at 1491-93.
199. See id at 1495.
200. Id
201. Id at 1497.
202. See, e.g., Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Drysdale Sec. Corp., 801 F.2d
13, 20-21 (2d Cir. 1986) (stating that the district court correctly instructed the jury that
the plaintiff established loss causation if it demonstrated that its "damage was either a
direct result of the misleading statement or one which could reasonably have been
foreseen" (quoting the district court judge) (internal quotations omitted)).
203. See supra notes 183-94 and accompanying text.
204. See supra note 179.
205. See infra note 207.
206. See infra note 207; see also Steckman & Conner, supra note 16, at 412
(discussing the materialization-of-the-risk approach).
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2 7
approach.
The materialization-of-the-risk approach was first utilized in
Bastian v. Petren Resources Corp.208 In Bastian, the plaintiffs alleged
that they suffered financial loss because the defendants'
misrepresentations caused them to invest in the defendants' limited
partnerships. 20 9 The plaintiffs did not, however, indicate why the
investment had been wiped out.210 Judge Posner stated that the
plaintiffs' loss was not due to the defendants' fraud, but to an
industry-wide collapse in oil and gas ventures.2 11 The court held that
the plaintiffs did not meet their burden of proving loss causation
because they had knowingly assumed the risk that oil prices might fall,
and never demonstrated that their injury was caused by something
212
other than the materialization of that risk.
Mallozzi v. Zoll Medical Corp.21 3 is a more recent example of a case
in which a court relied solely on the materialization-of-the-risk
approach. In Mallozzi, the plaintiffs, who were all purchasers of
defendant corporation's stock, argued that the "risks of which they
were unaware when they purchased the stock[, such as] the FDA
compliance problems, the significance of Physio-Control's return, and
the financial condition of the company-were the risks which, in fact,
materialized and triggered the plummeting stock prices. ' 21 4 The court
agreed and applied the "materialized risk" test to conclude that the
defendants misrepresented the FDA compliance problems and
company financial problems, that these risks materialized, and that
2t
these problems eventually caused the plaintiff's stock price to drop. 1
The court also held that the "direct causation" approach in
Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean2 16 overstated the test for loss
causation.2 7
Although the court in Huddleston analyzed loss causation under the
direct causation approach, it incorporated the language of
materialization of the risk into its direct causation analysis. 218 In
Huddleston, the plaintiffs had invested in the Texas International

207. See, e.g., Bastian v. Petren Resources Corp., 892 F.2d 680, 684-86 (7th Cir.
1990) (ruling that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the investment declined in
value because of the materialization of a risk that was undisclosed because of the
defendant's fraud).
208. 892 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1990).
209. See id. at 684.
210. See id.
211. See id. at 685.
212. See id. at 684-86.
213. No. 94-11579-NG, 1996 WL 392146 (D. Mass. March 5, 1996).
214. Id. at *10.
215. See id. at *11.
216. 640 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1981), affd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds,
459 U.S. 375 (1983).
217. Mallozzi, 1996 WL 392146, at *10.
218. See Huddleston, 640 F.2d at 549-50.
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Speedway ("TIS"), which filed for bankruptcy shortly after it went
public. 219 As a result, the plaintiffs filed suit, claiming that the
defendants' misleading prospectus regarding the cost of constructing
the speedway caused their economic loss.' The Fifth Circuit cited
Judge Meskill's dissenting opinion in Marbury-' and held that loss
causation refers to the direct causal link between the defendant's
fraud and the plaintiff's loss.m The court concluded that the jury
should have been allowed to consider the defendants' claim that the
plaintiffs' losses were actually caused by the "materialization of risks"
listed in the prospectus.? Thus, this case illustrates how the language
of materialization of the risk can sometimes be consistent with the
language of direct causation.
Broderick v. Menconi,1 on the other hand, demonstrates how the
materialization-of-the-risk approach and the direct causation
approach can produce different results. In Broderick, the defendants
fraudulently misrepresented the nature of the plaintiffs' investment as
low-risk.P Citing Bastian, the court ruled that "[w]here investors are
falsely told that an investment is not risky and the risk instead
develops, loss causation is satisfied." m Such language is indicative of
the materialization-of-the-risk approach, which differs from the direct
causation approach in that it takes into consideration the undisclosed
risks that a plaintiff is exposed to at the time of the transaction. If the
court in Broderick had adopted strict direct causation analysis, it
would have focused exclusively on whether the plaintiff proved that
the defendant's fraud caused the post-transaction decline in the value
of the investment. Such analysis probably would have led the court to
conclude that loss causation had not been established for reasons
similar to those given in Marbury's dissent.2 7 Thus, the direct
causation approach is not always consistent with the materializationof-the-risk approach.
Because the direct causation approach is stricter than the
materialization approach, a plaintiff can satisfy the materialization
approach by proving direct causationP8 Under the materialization-ofthe-risk approach, however, the burden of proof for a plaintiff is not
219. See id. at 539.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

See id.
See supra notes 191-94 and accompanying text.
See Huddleston, 640 F.2d at 549.
Id. at 549-50.
No. 88-C0161,1990 WL 51180 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 12, 1990).
See id at *1.
Id. at *2.

227. See Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 716-23 (2d Cir. 1980)
(Meskill, J., dissenting); infra notes 191-94 and accompanying text.

228. See, eg., Reshal Assoc., Inc. v. Long Grove Trading Co., 754 F. Supp. 1226,
1234 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (referring to the Bastian materialization-of-the-risk test and
concluding that the plaintiffs established loss causation because they specifically
alleged that their losses were "'a direct result"' of the defendants' fraud).
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as high as under the direct causation approach and thus a plaintiff is
not required to prove direct causation. Rather, the focus of a court's
inquiry is on whether the plaintiff's injury was caused by the
materialization of a risk that was undisclosed to the plaintiff because

of the defendant's fraud.
Although the degree of flexibility varies with each majority-view
approach, all three approaches share one common feature. Under
each approach, a plaintiff who uses post-transaction investment value
to measure recoverable loss must establish a connection between the
post-transaction investment value and the defendant's fraud.229 This
common characteristic is the fundamental difference between the
majority and minority views of loss causation.
2.

The Minority View

The minority view, also known as the "some causal nexus"
approach,230 allows a plaintiff to establish loss causation by simply
demonstrating that the defendant's fraud was connected to a loss
sustained at the time of the transaction. 231 The "some causal nexus
approach" expressly rejects the majority view and allows plaintiffs to
establish causation by broadly demonstrating a connection between
2 The Eighth and Ninth
their loss and the defendant's misconduct.
3

Circuits both advocate this approach.
In In re Control Data Corp. Securities Litigation,"4 the Eighth
Circuit stated that "[p]laintiffs are not required to meet a strict test of
direct causation under Rule 10b-5; they need only show 'some causal
nexus." '235 The plaintiff stock purchasers in the case claimed that
defendant Control Data Corporation ("CDC") misrepresented their
26

current and future earnings in a number of public statements.
Defendant argued that the plaintiffs did not establish causation
because the stock price did not significantly change after it corrected

229. See supra notes 163, 179, 207; see also supra notes 146-51 and accompanying
text (explaining how the majority view differs from the minority view).
230. In re Control Data Corp. Sec. Litig., 933 F.2d 616, 619 (8th Cir. 1991).
231. See infra note 233; see also supra notes 146-51 and accompanying text
(explaining how the minority view differs from the majority view).
232. See infra note 233; see also Steckman & Conner, supra note 16, at 413
(discussing the "some causal nexus" approach).
233. See, e.g., Knapp v. Ernst & Whinney, 90 F.3d 1431, 1438 (9th Cir. 1996) (ruling
that the plaintiffs did not have to prove that the defendant's fraud caused a decline in
the stock price and that the plaintiffs, who both purchased and sold their stock before
the release of the corrective statements, could recover because they proved that the
stock price was artificially inflated at the time of the transaction); In re Control Data,
933 F.2d at 619-20 (holding that the plaintiff did not have to establish direct causation
and that causation is presumed to the extent that the defendant's violations defrauded
the market and artificially altered the stock price at the time of the transaction).
234. 933 F.2d 616 (8th Cir. 1991).
235. Id. at 619.
236. See id. at 617.
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its fraudulent error 37 The defendant also pointed out that the drop in3
value occurred only after it revealed the status of its loan covenants,2
which it did not have a duty to disclose 3 9 The court viewed this
conception of causation as too narrow and ruled that "[a] jury could
reasonably find that CDC's improper accounting artificially altered
the price of CDC stock in a variety of ways." 24° Thus, the minority
view allows a plaintiff to attribute its loss to an artificially altered
transaction price, and it does not require a plaintiff to prove that the
defendant's fraud caused a post-transaction decline in the value of the
investment.
Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves 41 is another example of the Eighth
Circuit's adoption of the minority view. In Arthur Young, plaintiffs
were the purchasers of demand notes sold by the Farmer's
Cooperative of Arkansas and Oklahoma, Inc. 212 The defendant
argued that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate loss causation because
the plaintiffs were injured by the Co-op's bankruptcy, which was
unrelated to the defendant's alleged fraud.243 Applying its broad test
for loss causation, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs'
evidence was sufficient because it indicated that the Co-op would
have had considerable financial problems had the defendant made the
appropriate disclosure.2" The court also stated that a reasonable jury
could have found that the defendant's fraudulent misconduct
contributed to the Co-op's bankruptcy. 4 Thus, the holdings in both
In re Control Data Corp. Securities Litigation and Arthur Young make
it clear that the Eighth Circuit's approach to loss causation is the most
plaintiff-friendly of all approaches.
The Ninth Circuit seems to have shifted its position on loss
causation from the narrow direct causation approach to the broad
"some causal nexus" approach. In McGonigle v. Combs, plaintiffs
alleged that defendant's misrepresentations and omissions affected
the "quality" of their investment in a private placement of stock in a
California horse breeding company 47 The plaintiffs contended that
their loss was caused by the defendant's fraud because the fraud
induced them to purchase stock, which subsequently declined in
value."
The court disagreed and stated that such a contention
237.
238.
239.
240.

See id. at 618.
See id. at 619.
See id
Id at 619-20.

241. 937 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1991), aff'd sub non., Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507

U.S. 170 (1993).
242- See Arthur Young, 937 F.2d at 1315.
243. See id at 1332.

244. See id.
245. See id.
246. 968 F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1992).
247. See id. at 820.
248. See id-at 821.
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"renders the concept of loss causation meaningless by collapsing it
into transaction causation."249 To support its position, the Ninth
Circuit quoted a passage in Huddleston that stated, "the [defendant's]
untruth [must] in some reasonably direct, or proximate, way [be]
' °
responsible for [the plaintiff's] loss. '""
Although McGonigle squarely supports the direct causation
approach, Ninth Circuit cases subsequent to McGonigle have
retreated from its narrow conception of loss causation. In Knapp v.
Ernst & Whinney, the Ninth Circuit ruled that in fraud-on-themarket cases, a plaintiff can satisfy the loss causation requirement by
proving that the defendant's fraud artificially altered the purchase
price of the investment.' Knapp involved a class action brought by
investors in ATV stock against the defendant accounting firm for
alleged misrepresentations in financial statement?5 3 Defendant
argued that loss causation required the plaintiffs to prove that the
defendant's fraud caused the stock price to drop and that the
plaintiffs, who both purchased and sold their stock before public
disclosure of the defendant's fraud, failed the loss causation
requirement as a matter of law.254 The court disagreed, opining that
market forces created by the defendant's fraud could cause price
fluctuations to occur prior to public disclosure of the fraud. 51 The
court further remarked that while the post-disclosure price of a stock
can be used as evidence of the pre-disclosure value of that stock,
post56
disclosure price does not directly measure pre-disclosure value.
Additionally, in Provenz v. Miller, 57 the Ninth Circuit was

extremely plaintiff-friendly in holding that the burden of proof is
extremely heavy for a defendant who wishes to prove that the cause
responsible for the plaintiff's injury was not the one that the plaintiff
alleges." 6 In Provenz, the plaintiffs claimed that the value of the stock
they had purchased was artificially inflated because of the defendants'
fraud.59 Plaintiffs also alleged that the stock price fell soon after the
fraud was disclosed."6° The court ruled that for the defendants to
establish loss causation as a defense, they would have to prove, as a
matter of law, that factors other than the alleged misconduct caused
the stock price to fall.2 61 The court also ruled that the plaintiffs had
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

Id.
Id.
90 F.3d 1431 (9th Cir. 1996).
See id. at 1438.
See id. at 1434-35.
See id. at 1438.
See id.
See id.
102 F.3d 1478 (9th Cir. 1996).
See id. at 1492.
See id. at 1482.
See id. at 1492.
See id.
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successfully established loss causation because they demonstrated that
the defendant's fraud "'touched upon"' both the "overvalued price of
the stock" and "the fall in the price of the... stock."262 Although it is
unclear whether loss causation would have been established if the
plaintiffs had only proved that the stock price was overvalued at the
time of the transaction, both the holding in Knapp and the shifting of
the burden of proof in Provenz indicate that the Ninth Circuit, like the
Eighth Circuit, views loss causation in very broad terms.
The minority view of loss causation is more plaintiff-friendly than
any majority-view approach because minority-view plaintiffs can
establish loss causation by simply demonstrating that the defendant's
fraud was in some way responsible for artificially altering the
transaction price.' In contrast, majority-view plaintiffs who measure
recoverable loss based on post-transaction investment value must
establish a connection between the defendant's fraud and the postThis fundamental difference between the two
transaction loss.'
views greatly affects the extent of a plaintiff's burden of proof and can
ultimately be the principal factor in determining whether a plaintiff's
claim will succeed or fail. Thus, a substantial degree of inconsistency
and uncertainty currently exists in federal securities law jurisprudence,
which is likely to continue unless the conflict among courts is resolved.
The next part provides a detailed examination of the passage of the
PSLRA and its relevant provisions, which will play a critical role in
formulating a unified approach to loss causation.
III. THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995
In 1995, Congress enacted the PSLRA in order to reduce abusive
practices in federal securities litigation. Among other things, the
PSLRA codified loss causation by adding section 21D(b)(4) to the
1934 Act. Section 21D(b)(4) expressly states that "[iun any private
action arising under this chapter, the plaintiff shall have the burden of
proving that the act or omission of the defendant alleged to violate
this chapter caused the loss for which the plaintiff seeks to recover

262- Id.
263. See supra note 233; see also Berger & Buckser, supra note 16, at 478-79
(stating that some courts allow plaintiffs to establish loss causation by showing that
the defendant's fraud artificially altered the investment price at the time of the
transaction); Godnick & Calhoun, supra note 140, at 1 (explaining that in certain
jurisdictions plaintiffs can satisfy the loss causation requirement by demonstrating
that the investment price on the purchase date was artificially inflated because of the
defendant's fraud).
264. See supra notes 163, 179,207; see also Berger & Buckser, supra note 16, at 476.
78 (examining cases in which courts have analyzed loss causation by determining
whether a defendant's fraud touched upon reasons for the investment's price decline);
Godnick & Calhoun, supra note 140, at 1 (noting that some courts require plaintiffs to
prove that the defendant's fraud caused a post-transaction drop in the price of their
investment).
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damages. "265
Unfortunately, the statute does not provide a clear analytical
approach to guide courts in determining whether a plaintiff has
sufficiently pled loss causation. Although the codification of loss
causation does not resolve the split among the courts, it does provide
courts with a central authority for loss causation analysis. The
PSLRA establishes a firm foundation for evaluating the various loss
causation approaches, and thus analysis of the PSLRA is essential to
developing a resolution to the loss causation controversy. This part
describes the PSLRA's history and the Congressional rationale for
creating the law.
A. Legislative History
In 1991, the "Big Six" accounting firms and the American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants launched a lobbying campaign to gain
bipartisan support for legislation that would reform private securities
litigation.26 In their opinion, the laws governing private securities
litigation disproportionately favored plaintiffs and encouraged the
filing of frivolous lawsuits.2 67 Corporations contended that they were
victims of meritless class actions that were filed for the sole purpose of
extorting settlements.268
The final push for securities litigation reform came during the 1994
elections.2 69 The Republicans made securities reform a part of their
"Contract With America" platform and, after successfully capturing
the majority of seats in both the Senate and the House of
Representatives, securities reform seemed inevitable. 70 Immediately
upon the opening of the 104th Congress, Representative Henry J.
Hyde (R-Ill.) and 118 co-sponsors introduced H.R. 10, entitled the
"Common Sense Legal Reform Act of 1995" (the "House Reform
Act"). 271 Title II of the House Reform Act addressed securities
litigation reform and contained provisions that "could have eliminated
virtually all class actions under the federal securities laws. '272 The
House Reform Act also contained a loss causation provision that
stated the following:
265. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (Supp. 1997).
266. See Richard M. Phillips & Gilbert C. Miller, The PrivateSecurities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995: Rebalancing Litigation Risks and Rewards for Class Action
Plaintiffs, Defendants and Lawyers, 51 Bus. Law. 1009, 1018 (1996).
267. See id.
268. See Julia C. Kou, Note, Closing the Loophole in the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 253,253 (1998).
269. See Phillips & Miller, supra note 266, at 1018-19 & n.63.
270. See id.
271. See H.R. 10, 104th Cong. (1995); see also John W. Avery, Securities Litigation
Reform: The Long and Winding Road to the PrivateSecurities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995, 51 Bus. Law. 335,347 (1996) (discussing the introduction of H.R. 10).
272. Phillips & Miller, supra note 266, at 1019.
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concerning a security, the plaintiff must prove that he or she had
actual knowledge of and actually relied on such statement in
connection with the purchase or sale of a security and that the
misstatement or omission proximately caused (through both
transaction
causation and loss causation) any loss incurred by the
273
plaintiff.

In February 1995, House Commerce Committee Chairman Thomas
J. Bliley (R-Va.) introduced a revised bill ("H.R. 1058"), '- which was
passed in the House the following month.2 75 H.R. 1058 was essentially
the reported version of Title II of the House Reform Act with some
minor changes.276 The first three versions of H.R. 1058 addressed loss
causation in the following manner: "(1) In general.-in any private
action to which subsection (a) applies, the plaintiff shall prove that...
(B) [ ] the statement containing such misstatement or omission
proximately caused (through both transaction causation and loss
causation) any loss incurred by the plaintiff." -'
In January 1995, Senators Christopher J. Dodd (D-Conn.) and Pete
V. Domenici (R-N.M.) introduced reform bill S. 240 in the Senate as
"The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1 9 9 5 ."1 This bill
was more moderate than the House bill,27 9 but addressed similar issues
and shared the goal of diminishing abusive practices in securities
litigation.2 0 The first version of the bill, dated January 22, 1995,
contained the following loss causation provision:
273. H.R. 10 § 204. Loss causation was first introduced into the mix of reform
issues on May 17, 1994, when the Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs released a staff report on private
securities litigation. See Avery, supra note 271, at 362 n.189. In the staff report the
subcommittee expressed concern about courts adopting "a presumption of loss
causation (as well as reliance) in fraud-on-the-market cases." Id. The subcommittee
specifically stated:
Even if the fraud-on-the-market theory is a reasonable means of establishing
reliance, it is unclear that the theory should also be used to impute
causation. There may be cases in which the plaintiff reasonably relied on the
integrity of the market price, but the market price was not affected by the
defendant's misrepresentation because other information in the market
neutralized any impact which the misrepresentation might have had. It may
therefore be appropriate to require plaintiffs to provide proof in fraud-onthe-market cases that the alleged misrepresentation caused an effect on
market price.
Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs, Staff Report on Private Securities Litigation 228 (May 17. 1994)
(prepared at the direction of Sen. Dodd).
274. See H.R. 1058, 104th Cong. (1995) (enacted); see also Phillips & Miller, supra
note 266, at 1019 & n.70 (discussing the introduction of H.R. 1058).
275. See Phillips & Miller, supra note 266, at 1019.
276. See id
277. H.R. 1058 § 4.
278. See S. 240, 104th Cong. (1995); see also Avery, supra note 271. at 350
(discussing the introduction of S. 240).
279. See supra notes 274-77 and accompanying text.
280. See Phillips & Miller, supra note 266, at 1020.
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and in which the plaintiff claims to have bought or sold the security
based on a reasonable belief that the market value of the security
reflected all publicly available information, the plaintiff shall have
the burden of proving that the misstatement or omission caused any
loss incurred by the plaintiff.281
The bill was later modified by a loss causation provision amending
section 12282 of the 1933 Act, which gave defendants the opportunity
to demonstrate that the plaintiff's loss was the result of intervening
factors.3 Although this provision does not apply to Rule lOb-5
actions, it does contain the term "loss causation" and thus provides
more insight into what the PSLRA meant by the term "loss
causation."'

After months of negotiation, conferees of both houses met in
November 1995, reconciled the differences in the House and Senate
bills, and filed a Conference Report on the revised House bill. 5
Although the conferees made several significant changes, the bill's
final form was predominantly based on the Senate's version. In
addition to the House Conference Report,26 the conferees also filed a
"Statement of Managers" that contained a description of the purpose
and intent of the bill.' On December 5, 1995, the Senate passed the
House Conference Report,2 and the following day the House also
passed the bill. 9 However, less than an hour before it would have
become law, President Clinton unexpectedly vetoed the bill.290
Congress responded quickly. On December 20, 1995, the veto was
overridden by the House of Representatives 291 and on December 22,
1995, it was overridden by the Senate. 2 2 Thus, on December 22, 1995,
the PSLRA was voted into law.293

B.

Purposeof the PSLRA and Section 21D(b)(4)

Congress submitted two reports with the PSLRA legislation that
gave a detailed description of the purpose for the PSLRA's
enactment. The first report was Senate Report No. 104-98 (the

281. S. 240 §104.
282. See 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1994 & Supp. 1997).
283. See 15 U.S.C. § 771(b) (Supp. 1997); infra note 333 and accompanying text.
284. See infra notes 332-35 and accompanying text.
285. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
679, 730.
286. See id.
287. See id.
288. See Cong Rec. S17,997 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995).
289. See Cong Rec. H14,055 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1995).
290. See Cong Rec. H15,214-15 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995).
291. See Cong Rec. H15,223-24 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995).
292. See Cong Rec. S19,180 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1995).
293. See Cong Rec. S19,180 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1995).
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"Senate Report"),2' which was created by the Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs Committee on June 19, 1995.295 The second report was
House Conference Report No. 104-369 (the "House Report"),- 6
which was created by conferees of both chambers on November 28,
1995.29 In addition to stating Congress's reasons for enacting the
PSLRA, both reports also expressed Congress's underlying rationale
for codifying loss causation by adding section 21D(b)(4) to the 1934
Act via the PSLRA.
1. The Senate Report
According to the Senate Report, the Banking Committee heard
substantial testimony that the cost of raising capital for businesses was
being significantly increased by the rising number of frivolous
securities suits that "professional plaintiffs"2 98 were filing against
corporate defendants pursuant to federal securities laws.'
The
report noted that lawyers brought frivolous suits because defendants
often settled in order to avoid the exorbitant costs associated with
litigation.3'
Taking these findings into consideration, the report
asserted that the PSLRA was intended to combat abuses in federal
securities litigation without reducing the incentives for filing

meritorious claims. 30 1
The report also made clear that Congress wanted to reassert its
authority in the area of securities fraud in order to reconcile the
"conflicting legal standards" that had developed as a result of section
10(b) litigation evolving out of case law.-"0'- According to the report,
these "conflicting legal standards" created too many uncertainties and
opportunities for abusive practices. 30
With respect to loss causation, the report stated that the loss
causation provision in S. 240 was another provision designed to reduce
the cost of raising capital. 10 In other words, it was intended to make it
more difficult for a plaintiff to establish a cause of action. Under the
heading "A strong pleading requirement," the report further
discussed loss causation and specifically stated that:
The Committee also requires the plaintiff to show that the
294. See S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 1 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 679.
295. See id.
296. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995), reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
679,730.
297. See id.
298. Professional plaintiffs are plaintiffs who regularly lend their names to lawsuits.
See S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 6, reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 685.
299. See id.
300. See id at 6-7, reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 685-86.
301. See id. at 10, reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 689.
302. Id. at 4, reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 683.
303. Id.
304. See id. at 7, reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 686.
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misstatement or loss alleged in the complaint caused the loss
incurred by the plaintiff. For example, the plaintiff would have to
prove that the price at which the plaintiff bought the stock was
artificially inflated as the result of the misstatement or omission.
The defendant would then have the opportunity to prove any
mitigating circumstances,
or that factors unrelated to the fraud
30 5
contributed to the lOSS.
Both the heading "A strong pleading requirement" and the
language used in this description of the loss causation provision
indicate that Congress codified loss causation by adding section
21D(b)(4) to the 1934 Act via the PSLRA in order to increase the
plaintiff's burden of proof.
2.

The House Report

The House Report included a Statement of Managers, which set
forth the purpose of the PSLRA and provided a brief description of
the PSLRA's various provisions.3 6 According to the House Report,
both the House and Senate Committees heard evidence of the
following abusive practices:
(1) lawyers filing frivolous lawsuits
against deep-pocket defendants without having any evidence of fraud;
(2) plaintiffs using the discovery process to impose excessive costs on
defendants in order to induce settlement; and (3) class action lawyers
manipulating their clients. 3°7 The Act was intended to remedy these
abuses.308
Under the heading "Loss causation," the House Report gave the
following description:
The Conference Committee also requires the plaintiff to plead and
then to prove that the misstatement or omission alleged in the
complaint actually caused the loss incurred by the plaintiff in new
Section 21D(b)(4) of the 1934 Act. For example, the plaintiff would
have to prove that the price at which the plaintiff bought the stock
was artificially inflated as the result of the misstatement or
omission.3 9
Like the Senate Report, the language used in this description of loss
causation suggests that the purpose of the loss causation provision was
to increase the pleading and proof requirements for a plaintiff.
The legislative history of the PSLRA, the Senate Report, and the
House Report all support the contention that loss causation was
codified in section 21D(b)(4) of the 1934 Act via the PSLRA in order

305. Id. at 15, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694.
306. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
679, 730.
307. See id. at 31, reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730.
308. See id.
309. Id. at 41, reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 740.
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to make it more difficult for plaintiffs to file frivolous securities
suits.31 The bills leading up to the PSLRA all provided that loss
causation is the plaintiff's burden.31 ' Likewise, the Senate Report and

House Report both state that the plaintiff must prove that the
defendant's fraud actually caused the loss incurred by the plaintiff.3 12

Although various reports suggest that the PSLRA was not successful
at accomplishing all of its goals, 313 the fact remains that Congress
added section 21D(b)(4) to the 1934 Act via the PSLRA in order to
heighten a plaintiff's burden of proof in lawsuits brought pursuant to
the federal securities laws. The next part utilizes this fact as a basis for
constructing a resolution to the loss causation controversy.
IV.

RESOLUTION

This part uses the PSLRA as a foundation to critique the various

loss causation approaches. It proposes that in light of the PSLRA's
goals, the materialization-of-the-risk approach is the optimal
approach to loss causation.
Although courts continue to rely on the precedents set prior to its
enactment,3 14 the PSLRA is a central authority on loss causation that
310. See supra notes 266-68,298-309 and accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 271-81 and accompanying text.
312. See supra notes 298-309 and accompanying text.
313. At first the PSLRA appeared to be successful, but eventually a number of
studies led Congress to conclude that additional legislation would be necessary to
curtail securities fraud litigation. See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of
1998, 105 Pub. L. No. 105-353, § 2, 112 Stat. 3227, 3227 (1998) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). National Economic Research Associates ("NERA')
conducted the first study to examine the impact of the PSLRA on securities fraud
litigation. See Frank Placenti, Litigation Reform Incomplete: Class-Action Lawsuits
Continue to Hamper Market, Ariz. Republic, Apr. 24, 1997, at E2. The NERA study
revealed that in early 1996, immediately after Congress passed the PSLRA, the
number of securities lawsuits filed in federal courts declined; however, increased
filings in the latter half of the year resulted in little change between the 1995 and 1996
federal class action filings. See i. The NERA study also indicated that the number of
state filings had increased since the passage of the PSLRA. See id.The second study
to examine the effects of the PSLRA on securities fraud litigation was conducted by
two Stanford University law professors. See id. According to the Stanford study, the
number of federal class action cases filed had declined between 1995 and 1996;
however, the number of state filings increased and the total number of class action
securities fraud filings remained unchanged. See id. Finally, in early 1998, the SEC
reported that the number of federal class action securities fraud filings rose to 175 in
1997 from 106 in 1996. See Class-Action Lawsuits Stage "97 Rebound Despite Legal
Curbs, Wall St. J., Feb. 19, 1998, at B2. In response to these studies and to prevent
the objectives of the PSLRA from being frustrated by state private securities class
action lawsuits, Congress passed the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of
1998, which purported to solve the problem by limiting the conduct of securities class
actions under state law. See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, 105
Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C.). President Clinton signed the Act into law on Nov. 3,1998. See id.
314. See, e.g., Coates v. Heartland Wireless Communications, Inc., 26 F. Supp. 2d
910, 923 (N.D. Tex. 1998) (holding that "the PSLRA does not alter the standards for
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can guide courts in their loss causation analyses. On its surface the
PSLRA codifies loss causation by adding section 21D(b)(4) to the
1934 Act. Section 21D(b)(4) expressly states that "[i]n any private
action arising under this chapter, the plaintiff shall have the burden of
proving that the act or omission of the defendant alleged to violate
this chapter caused the loss for which the plaintiff seeks to recover
damages. ' 31 5 While this description of loss causation does not
expressly indicate the approach that courts should utilize, it does
provide courts with a central rule from which a single understanding
of loss causation can be formed. Developing such an understanding
simply requires courts to draw upon the legislative history of the
PSLRA so that Congress's meaning of loss causation can be fully
appreciated.
The legislative history of the PSLRA predominantly favors the
majority view of loss causation for two primary reasons. First,
Congress enacted the PSLRA in order to make it more difficult for
plaintiffs to file frivolous securities suits. 316 Likewise, the majority
view heightens a plaintiff's burden by requiring plaintiffs who use
post-transaction investment value to measure recoverable loss to
37
prove that the defendant's fraud caused the post-transaction loss.
Second, loss causation was first introduced into the mix of reform
issues because the Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs was concerned
about loss causation being presumed in fraud-on-the-market cases.31 8
Courts following the majority view have also ruled that loss causation
cannot be presumed in fraud-on-the-market cases, whereas courts
following the minority view have concluded that loss causation can be
presumed in such cases.319
Some of the language used in the Senate Report320 also supports the
majority view. According to the Senate Report, a plaintiff is required
to prove that the defendant's fraud caused a "loss in the value of their
stock. ' 321 The minority view never requires a plaintiff to prove that

pleading loss causation"); Retsky Family Ltd. Partnership v. Price Waterhouse, LLP,
No. 97 C 7694, 1998 WL 774678, at *9-*14 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 1998) (applying the
PSLRA to its scienter analysis, but failing to apply it to its loss causation analysis).
But see, e.g., Castillo v. Dean Witter Discover & Co., No. 97 Civ. 1272 (RPP), 1998
WL 342050, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 1998) (recognizing that the purpose of the
PSLRA was to make a more stringent pleading standard for each Rule lOb-5 element
and holding that the "PSLRA requires plaintiffs to link each act or omission of the
defendant to the plaintiffs' alleged losses" (citation omitted)).
315. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (Supp. 1997).
316. See supra Part III.
317. See supra Part II.C.
318. See supra note 273.
319. See supra notes 140-44 and accompanying text.
320. See supra note 294; Part III.B.1.
321. S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 7 (1995), reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 686.
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the defendant's fraud caused such a loss.3 " Rather, the minority view
requires only that the plaintiff demonstrate that the defendant's fraud
was in some way responsible for artificially altering the transaction
price.3" The majority view, on the other hand, requires plaintiffs, who
use post-transaction investment value to measure recoverable loss, to
demonstrate that the defendant's fraud caused the post-transaction
change in the value of the investment.324 Thus, some of the language
used in the Senate Report is more consistent with the majority view.
An argument can be made, however, that other language used in
the Senate Report is more consistent with the minority view. For
example, in describing loss causation, the Senate Report states that
the plaintiff would have to prove that the defendant's fraud caused
"the price at which the plaintiff bought the stock" to be "artificially
inflated. ' '31 If this is all that any plaintiff need prove, then the
majority view is too strict because under the majority view, plaintiffs
who use post-transaction investment value to measure recoverable
loss must also prove that the defendant's fraud caused the posttransaction change in the value of the investment. 6 Thus, while some
of the language used in the Senate Report supports the majority view,
other language supports the minority view. On balance, however, the
Senate Report favors the majority view because the Senate Report as
a whole illustrates Congress's intention to curtail the number of
frivolous securities suits. 327 This is more in line with the majority view
because
a plaintiff's burden of proof is higher under the majority
32
view.
The actual provisions of the PSLRA also favor the majority view.
When section 21D(b)(4) 329 of the 1934 Act (added by the PSLRA) is
read in conjunction with section 105 33 of the PSLRA and section
21D(e) of the 1934 Act331 (added by the PSLRA), a strong argument
can be made that the PSLRA advocates the majority view. Although
section 105 of the PSLRA does not pertain to Rule 10b-5 litigation,"
322. See supra Part II.C.
323. See supra Part II.C.
324. See supra Part II.C.

325. S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 15, reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 694. The same
description can also be found in the House Conference Report. See H.R Conf. Rep.
No. 104-369, at 41 (1995), reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 740.
326. See supra Part II.C.
327. See supra Part III.B.1.
328. See supra Part II.C.
329. See supra notes 14, 265, 315 and accompanying text.
330. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L No. 104-67, tit. 1,
§ 105, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 771(b) (Supp. 1997)): infra note 333

and accompanying text.
331. See supra note 105; infra note 336 and accompanying text.
332. Section 105 amends section 12, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1994 & Supp. 1997), which is a

provision that expressly creates a private cause of action for material misstatements
and omissions in connection with an offer or sale of a security. See id.§ 771(b), see also

supra notes 282-84 and accompanying text (explaining that a loss causation provision
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examining section 105 is appropriate because it provides a more
complete understanding of what the PSLRA meant by the term "loss
causation." Section 105 specifically states:
(b) Loss Causation
In an action described in subsection (a)(2) of this section, if the
person who offered or sold such security proves that any portion or
all of the amount recoverable under subsection (a)(2) of this section
represents other than the depreciation in value of the subject
security resulting from such part of the prospectus or oral
communication, with respect to which the liability of that person is
asserted, not being true or omitting to state a material fact required
to be stated therein or necessary to make the statement not
misleading, then such
333 portion or amount, as the case may be, shall
not be recoverable.
Thus, section 105 places the loss causation burden on the defendant
and discusses loss causation in terms of a defendant's right to reduce
his liability by demonstrating that intervening factors were responsible
for an investment's decline in value.'
Reading section 21D(b)(4) in
conjunction with section 105 leads to the conclusion that the plaintiff
in a Rule 10b-5 private action would have the burden of proving that
intervening factors were not responsible for the alleged loss.335 In
other words, the plaintiff would have to prove that the defendant's
fraud directly caused the alleged loss. This reflects the language of
direct causation under the majority view.
Section 21D(e) also weighs in favor of the majority view. Section
21D(e) places an upward limitation on damages in Rule 10b-5
litigation. The provision specifically states:
(1) In general
Except as provided in paragraph (2), in any private action arising
under this chapter in which the plaintiff seeks to establish damages
by reference to the market price of a security, the award of damages
to the plaintiff shall not exceed the difference between the purchase
or sale price paid or received, as appropriate, by the plaintiff for the
subject security and the mean trading price of that security during
the 90-day period beginning on the date on which the information
correcting the misstatement or omission that is the basis for the
action is disseminated to the market.
(2) Exception
In any private action arising under this chapter in which the
plaintiff seeks to establish damages by reference to the market price
of a security, if the plaintiff sells or repurchases the subject security
prior to the expiration of the 90-day period described in paragraph
(1), the plaintiff's damages shall not exceed the difference between
amending section 12 was added to S. 240).
333. 15 U.S.C. § 771(b) (Supp. 1997).
334. See id.

335. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-4(b)(4), 771(b) (Supp. 1997).
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the purchase or sale price paid or received, as appropriate, by the
plaintiff for the security and the mean trading price of the security
during the period beginning immediately after dissemination of
information correcting the misstatement or omission and ending on
the date on which the plaintiff sells or repurchases the security.-This provision challenges the practical workability of the artificialinflation theory of loss causation. 3 7 Even under the minority view,
which would allow a plaintiff to establish loss causation by simply
alleging that the defendant's fraud artificially inflated the security,
damages could not be recovered if the price of the security does not
actually decline, or if it declines and rebounds within a 90-day
period. 338 Although the provision does not require a plaintiff who
uses post-transaction investment value to measure recoverable loss to
prove that the defendant's fraud caused the post-transaction loss, the
provision does restrict the recovery for such a plaintiff to the amount
of the post-transaction loss. If the plaintiff's recovery cannot exceed
the amount of the post-transaction loss, then the plaintiff should
arguably have to prove that the defendant's fraud caused that posttransaction loss, which is exactly what the majority view requires.
Despite acknowledging that the new damages provision represents
a political judgment that plaintiffs should bear the risks of posttransaction price fluctuations, one scholar contends:
The issue is the extent to which that misrepresentation or omission
created a disparity between the plaintiff's transaction price and the
actual value of securities--on the date of the transaction.... After,
but only after, the disparity between the transaction price and the
actual value of the security on the date of the transaction is
calculated, should the parties and their expert consider the impact of
the "cap" on that otherwise accurate measure.-

Thus, an argument can be made that the minority view is not
affected by the new damages rule because a plaintiff who uses posttransaction investment value to measure recoverable loss can still
assert that the actual injury took place at the time of the transaction
and therefore such a plaintiff should arguably only have to establish a
connection between the defendant's fraud and the artificial
transaction price. According to this interpretation of the damages
provision, the new damages formula does nothing more than provide
courts with a general method for approximating what the value of the
security would have been at the time of the transaction in the absence
of the defendant's fraud.'
But even if the new damages formula is viewed in this way and a
336.
337.
33&
339.
340.

15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e) (Supp. 1997).
See Berger & Buckser, supra note 16, at 479.
See id.
Kaufman, Damages, supra note 94, § 1B:07, at 18 (1997).
See id. § 1B:06, at 11-12.
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post-transaction price decline represents nothing more than evidence
of an artificial transaction price, the plaintiff should still have to prove
that the defendant's fraud caused the post-transaction price decline?"'
If the defendant's fraud had nothing to do with the post-transaction
price decline, then a plaintiff should not be allowed to use the price
decline as evidence of the true value of the investment at the time of
the transaction. The new damages provision limits the amount of
recovery to the amount of the post-transaction price decline;
therefore, the plaintiff should always have to prove that the posttransaction price decline was caused by the defendant's fraud even if
the plaintiff is simply using the decline as evidence of transactionbased loss. If the defendant's fraud did not cause the post-transaction
price decline, it would make no sense to allow the plaintiff to use it as
evidence for recovery. Thus, both the legislative history and the
specific provisions of the PSLRA support the majority view.
Although a number of credible arguments can be made in favor of
the minority conception of loss causation, 34z the arguments made in
support of the majority view are more convincing in light of the
PSLRA.34
Therefore, in order to satisfy the loss causation
requirement, a plaintiff who uses post-transaction investment value to
measure recoverable loss should have to prove that the defendant's
fraud caused the post-transaction change in the value of the
investment. But one question still remains: which of the three
majority approaches is best suited for loss causation analysis?
One of the primary areas of difficulty in loss causation analysis
involves distinguishing between price declines attributed to general
market conditions and price declines attributed to a defendant's fraud.
Because majority-view plaintiffs can recover only when price declines
are attributed to a defendant's fraud, courts must be able to ascertain
the difference.' Furthermore, while majority-view courts have not
required plaintiffs to prove that their injury was exclusively caused by
the defendant's fraud, they have required plaintiffs to prove that their
injury was substantially caused by the defendant's fraud.35 Thus, in
situations where price declines are the result of a combination of
general market conditions and the defendant's fraud, courts need to
be able to determine whether the bulk of the loss was caused by the
341. See generally Berger & Buckser, supra note 16, at 479 (stating that "the

practical viability of the 'artificial inflation' theory of loss causation may be called into
doubt by the enactment of the PSLRA").
342. See supra notes 325-26, 339-40 and accompanying text.
343. See supra notes 316-24, 327-38 and accompanying text.
344. See supra Part II.C.
345. See, e.g., Robbins v. Koger Properties, Inc., 116 F.3d 1441, 1447 (11th Cir.

1997) (holding that "the plaintiff need not show the defendant's act was the sole and
exclusive cause of the injury he has suffered; he need only show that it was
substantial, i.e., a significant contributing cause" (quoting Bruschi v. Brown, 876 F.2d

1526, 1531 (11th Cir. 1989) (internal quotations omitted)).
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market conditions or the defendant's fraud.'
The direct causation approach attempts to make the distinction
between price declines resulting from general market conditions and
price declines resulting from the defendant's fraud by requiring a
plaintiff to prove that the price decline was not attributed to
intervening factors.347 The first problem with such a requirement is
that proving a negative is very difficult. While it would be appropriate
for a defendant to point out intervening factors as a defense, it would
be inappropriate to require a plaintiff to prove the absence of
intervening factors.? The number of potential intervening factors is

virtually limitless.
Direct causation is also troubling because in certain circumstances it
overstates the test for loss causation.319 For example, in Marbury's
dissent, Judge Meskill's strict adherence to the direct causation
approach led him to an unjust and unsympathetic conclusion." Judge
Meskill argued that the plaintiffs failed to establish loss causation
because the defendant's misrepresentations as to his qualifications as
a broker did not directly cause the depreciation in the market value of
the investments he promoted.3 5' Even though Judge Meskill shared in
the majority's condemnation of the defendant's misconduct,35 - he
contended that the plaintiffs were not entitled to damages because the

chain of causation was severed by supervening events."'

-

Despite the

fact that common notions of fairness supported the plaintiffs' claim
for relief, Judge Meskill concluded that they should have been denied
recovery.3 4 Thus, the direct causation approach can sometimes be

overly stringent and unyielding.
The foreseeability approach, on the other hand, is a more flexible
346. See, e.g., Medline Indus., Inc. v. Blunt, Ellis & Loewi, Inc., No. 89-C4851, 1993
WL 13436, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 21, 1993) (finding that while market forces probably
contributed to the plaintiffs' injury, the plaintiffs established loss causation because
they proved that their losses also stemmed from the misrepresented risky nature of
the investment).
347. For a discussion of the direct causation approach, see supra Part lI.C.l.a.
348. This fact might explain why section 105, which places the loss causation
burden on defendants in section 12(a)(2) actions, discusses loss causation in terms of a
defendant's right to reduce his liability by proving that an intervening cause was
responsible for the decline in the value of the investment. See supra note 333 and
accompanying text. Whereas section 21D(b)(4), which places the loss causation
burden on plaintiffs in Rule 10b-5 private actions, discusses loss causation without any
reference to intervening causes and simply states that a plaintiff must prove that the
defendant's fraud caused the alleged loss. See supra notes 265, 315 and accompanying
text.
349. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
350. See Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 716-17 (2d Cir. 1980)
(Meskill, J., dissenting); supra notes 191-94 and accompanying text.
351. See Marbury, 629 F.2d at 717; supra notes 191-94 and accompanying text.
352. See Marbury, 629 F.2d at 717.
353. See id at 722; supra notes 191-94 and accompanying text.
354. See Marbury, 629 F.2d at 722-23; supra notes 191-94 and accompanying text.
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approach to loss causation. Under the foreseeability approach, courts
focus on foreseeability and not on chains of causation or intervening
events.355 Courts applying the foreseeability approach attempt to
distinguish between price declines resulting from general market
conditions and price declines resulting from the defendant's fraud by
requiring a plaintiff to prove that the price decline was a reasonably
foreseeable consequence of the defendant's fraud.356
The problem with the foreseeability approach is that it sometimes
understates the test for loss causation.3 57 For example, in Bastian,
despite acknowledging that the plaintiffs' loss causation burden would
have been satisfied under a test of foreseeability, 358 the district court
ruled that the plaintiffs had failed to establish loss causation.3 19 The
district court refused to adopt foreseeability analysis because it
considered such analysis an oversimplification of the loss causation
issue.3" The district court's decision was consistent with common
notions of fairness because the decline in value of the plaintiffs'
investment was not related to a risk that the defendants had
concealed, but to an industry-wide collapse, which was a risk that the
plaintiffs had assumed. 361 Therefore, while the foreseeability
approach is appropriate in situations similar to Marbury, it is
inappropriate in situations such as Bastian because it does not make a
clear enough distinction between losses that stem from the
defendant's fraud and losses that stem from general market
conditions.
The last majority-view approach to critique is the materializationof-the-risk approach.
The materialization-of-the-risk approach
attempts to make a distinction between price declines resulting from
general market conditions and price declines resulting from the
defendant's fraud by requiring a plaintiff to prove that the defendant's
fraud was responsible for an undisclosed risk that materialized and
caused the post-transaction loss. 362 Such an approach is well-suited for
loss causation analysis because securities fraud inherently involves all
forms of risk. Furthermore, out of the three approaches, the
materialization-of-the-risk approach does the best job of analyzing the
specific causes for a plaintiffs loss. Separating the risks at the time of
355. For a discussion of the foreseeability approach, see supra Part II.C.l.b.
356. See supra Part II.C.1.b.
357. See, e.g., Bastian v. Petren Resources Corp., 681 F. Supp. 530, 534-36 (N.D. I11.
1988) (holding that the foreseeability approach oversimplifies loss causation analysis
and dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint for failure to establish loss causation).
358. See id. at 534 n.3.
359. See id. at 534-36.
360. See id. at 534 & n.3, 535.
361. See Bastian v. Petren Resources Corporation, 892 F.2d 680, 685 (7th Cir.
1990); supra notes 208-12 and accompanying text.
362. For a discussion of the materialization-of-the-risk approach, see supra Part
II.C.l.c.
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the transaction into undisclosed risks and general market risks makes
it easier to pinpoint the source of a plaintiffs post-transaction loss.
The materialization-of-the-risk approach also does the best job of
balancing the interests of plaintiffs and defendants. ' For example, in
Bastian, the Seventh Circuit appropriately ruled that the plaintiffs'
had not established loss causation because their loss was caused by an
industry-wide collapse, which was a risk that they had assumed at the
time of the transaction. 31 As discussed above, the district court in
Bastian refused to apply a foreseeability analysis because such an
On
analysis produced an outcome that was too plaintiff-friendly.'
the flip side, in Broderick, a district court applying the materializationof-the-risk approach held that the plaintiff had established loss
causation because the defendant's fraud subjected the plaintiff to an
undisclosed risk at the time of the transaction and the plaintiffs' injury
was caused by the materialization of that undisclosed risk. 'Although Marbury involved a similar fact pattern, the dissent's strict
adherence to the direct causation approach led it to an unjust
conclusion in favor of the defendant. 67 Thus, the materialization-ofthe-risk approach strikes a fair balance between the plaintiff-friendly
foreseeability approach and the defendant-friendly direct causation
approach.
Because the materialization-of-the-risk approach enables courts to
strike such a balance, it is the approach that is most consistent with
the legislative history of the PSLRA. Although the PSLRA was
designed to make it more difficult for plaintiffs to file frivolous
securities suits,3 s it was not designed to prevent true victims of
securities fraud from bringing valid claims against fraudulent violators
of securities laws.369 In the words of the Senate Report, "[i]n crafting
this legislation,... [Congress] has sought to strike the appropriate
balance between protecting the rights of victims of securities fraud
363. See, e.g., Bastian, 892 F.2d at 685 (holding that the plaintiffs did not establish

loss causation because their loss was not caused by the defendant's fraud, but by an
industry-wide collapse); Broderick v. Menconi, No. 88-C 0161, 1990 WL 51180, at *2
(N.D. 11. Apr. 12, 1990) (concluding that the plaintiffs established loss causation
because the defendant misrepresented the risky nature of the investment and it was
the risky nature of the investment that caused the plaintiffs' loss); supra notes 208-12,
224-27 and accompanying text (discussing Bastian and Broderick); see also Steckman
& Conner, supra note 16, at 458-59 (asserting that courts relying on Bastian have
generated "both defense and plaintiff-friendly cases").

364. See Bastian, 892 F.2d at 685; supra notes 208-12,361 and accompanying text.
365. See Bastian v. Petren Resources Corporation, 681 F. Supp. 530, 534 (N.D. I11.
1988); supra notes 358-60.
366. See Broderick, 1990 WL 51180, at *1-*2 (N.D. I11.Apr. 12, 1990); supra notes

224-27 and accompanying text.
367. See Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 716-17 (2d Cir. 1980)

(Meskill, J., dissenting); supra notes 191-94, 350-54 and accompanying text.
368. See supra Part Ill.
369. See S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 10 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 689;
supra note 294.
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and the rights of public companies to avoid costly and meritless
litigation."37
Of the three majority-view approaches, the
materialization-of-the-risk approach does the best job at striking this
"appropriate balance; '37' therefore, the legislative history of the
PSLRA most supports the materialization-of-the-risk approach.
In conclusion, there are four convincing reasons why the
materialization-of-the-risk approach is the best approach for loss
causation analysis. First, it adheres to the majority view of loss
causation, which is supported by both the legislative history and
provisions of the PSLRA.372 Second, it provides the best analytical
means
for pinpointing the source of a plaintiff's post-transaction
loss.3 73 Third, it strikes the fairest balance between the interests of
plaintiffs and defendants. 374 Finally, it produces results that are
directly in line with the goals that Congress set for the PSLRA.375
Thus, the materialization-of-the-risk approach is the winning
approach to loss causation.
CONCLUSION

The PSLRA has provided the foundation for developing a uniform
approach to loss causation. Although the PSLRA does not explicitly
resolve the loss causation controversy, it does subject the various
incarnations of loss causation to a central authority. Furthermore,
when the PSLRA is examined in conjunction with Rule 10b-5 case
law, the materialization-of-the-risk approach, which adheres to the
majority view of loss causation,376 emerges as the model approach to
loss causation.
The materialization-of-the-risk approach requires plaintiffs to prove
that their loss was caused by the materialization of a risk that was
undisclosed at the time of the transaction because of the defendant's
fraud.377 Analyzing loss causation in such a way has consistently
produced equitable results for both plaintiffs and defendants,37 and
thus the materialization-of-the-risk approach should be used by all
courts as the standard means for loss causation analysis. Uniform
utilization of the materialization-of-the-risk approach would greatly
diminish the amount of inconsistency, uncertainty, and injustice in
370. S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 10, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 689. For a more
detailed discussion of the Senate Report, see supra Part III.B.1.
371. See supra notes 363-67 and accompanying text.
372. See supra notes 316-43 and accompanying text.
373. See supra note 362 and accompanying text.
374. See supra notes 363-67 and accompanying text.
375. See supra notes 368-71 and accompanying text.
376. Under the majority view, a plaintiff who uses post-transaction investment
value to measure recoverable loss must establish a connection between the posttransaction investment value and the defendant's fraud. See supra Part II.C.
377. See supra Part II.C.1.c.
378. See supra notes 363-67 and accompanying text.
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Rule 10b-5 securities litigation and would finally close the chapter on
loss causation's long history of turmoil and confusion.

Notes & Observations

